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THE SALARY CAP: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF AND PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL
DAVID ROTHSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The National Basketball Association (NBA) is a booming bus-
iness. This was not, however, always the case.1 During the late
1970s and early 1980s, the league experienced a variety of financial
problems that reduced its profitability and threatened its contin-
ued existence.2
For an NBA franchise to achieve financial success, it must
draw fans to its games, and typically fan attendance is directly
proportional to a team's success on the court.3 Simply put, every-
one loves a winner, and no one wants to pay money to see a loser.
Thus, each NBA team is continually searching to stack its roster
with the best talent available in the hope that its team will win as
many games as possible, the victories translating into box office
profits. Accordingly, the demand for the best players is great, and
owners are ready and willing to open their checkbooks to acquire
* B.A., 1992, College of the Holy Cross; J.D., 1995, University of Miami School of Law.
Special thanks to Alan Fein, Steve Kauffman, Nichelle King, Myron Myers, Irwin Stotzky,
Dick Watston, and my father.
1. Revenues for the 1992-93 NBA season eclipsed the $1 billion dollar mark, as com-
pared to the $200 million earned in the 1983-84 season. Andrew E. Server, How High?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 8, 1993, at 89.
2. The league's difficulties were caused by team owners offering free agents massive
salaries in an attempt to lure the best players to their respective teams. During this period,
however, the increases in some teams' gross income did not keep pace with the inevitable
increases in player salaries. Jeffrey E. Levine, The Legality and Efficacy of the National
Basketball Association Salary Cap, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 73 (1992). The prob-
lem began to compound itself as the financially unsuccessful teams, unable to afford the
most talented players, were continually losing on the court, resulting in severe decreases in
box office revenues. Lloyd C. Bronstein, Sports Law: Antitrust Suit Fails to Knock Off
NBA's Salary Cap, 6 Loy. ENT. J. 231, 240 (1986). The league as a whole was losing $15
million per year. Scott J. Foraker, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An
Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1985). Four teams-Cleveland Cavaliers,
Indiana Pacers, Utah Jazz, and Kansas City Kings-were in jeopardy of folding, and there
were two to four teams for sale that purportedly could not find buyers at any price. Levine,
supra, at 73.
3. Levine, supra note 2, at 73.
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the services of the league's choice players.' The financial woes of
the NBA during the late 1970s and early 1980s made it increas-
ingly difficult for teams in the smaller markets, with less monetary
power, to keep their better players, let alone acquire new ones.
This resulted in a growing competitive imbalance among NBA
teams and plummeting buyer interest in small market franchises,
both of which prompted a decrease in the perceived value of NBA
franchises.'
In 1983, against this background, the NBA and the National
Basketball Players Association (hereinafter "Players Association")
sat down at the collective bargaining table to hammer out an
agreement they hoped would set the league on the path to profit-
ability. These negotiations resulted in an agreement unprece-
dented in any professional sport and was commonly referred to as
the "salary cap." 6 The key feature of the salary cap was a revenue
4. Id.
5. Bronstein, supra note 2, at 240. Perhaps the most shocking example of all the evils
associated with the pre-cap era of unrestrained free agency occurred prior to the 1982-83
season when the owner of the Philadelphia 76ers, Harold Katz, dug deep into his pockets
and simply bought himself a championship caliber team via the acquisition of perennial All-
Star Moses Malone, at the time a free agent. The message was clear: for the right price, any
franchise could buy success.
6. The principles of the salary cap were laid out in this collective bargaining agree-
ment which has become known as the Memorandum of Understanding. Memorandum of
Understanding Between National Basketball Association and National Basketball Players
Association (Apr. 18, 1983) (on file with author) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Un-
derstanding]. The history of the Memorandum of Understanding dates back to 1970, when:
NBA players commenced a class action suit against the NBA in the federal
district court for the Southern District of New York. [The players challenged]
on antitrust grounds certain player restrictions imposed by the NBA team own-
ers, including the [collegiate draft and what was known as the reserve system.
This litigation came to a head in 1976 when the district court approved an
agreement between the parties known as the Robertson Settlement Agreement.
Also] in 1976, the Players Association and the NBA . . .entered into a multi-
year collective bargaining agreement that incorporated the substantive terms of
the Robertson Settlement Agreement. The 1976 collective bargaining agreement
expired on June 1, 1979, and on October 10, 1980, the parties again entered into
a multi-year collective bargaining agreement that expressly incorporated the
terms of the Robertson settlement agreement.
The 1980 agreement expired on June 1, 1982. In 1983, the NBA sought for
the first time to introduce the salary cap, contending that such a restriction was
necessary because the majority of NBA teams were losing money, in part be-
cause of rising player salaries and benefits. The players responded by filing a
lawsuit challenging the legality of the proposed practice. Lanier v. National Bas-
ketball Association, 82 Civ. 4935 (S.D.N.Y.). A Special Master appointed to hear
disputes under the Robertson settlement agreement determined that the salary
cap would violate the terms of the settlement agreement, and therefore could
not be imposed absent a modification of that agreement.
The Players Association and the NBA then entered into [the] Memorandum
[Vol. 11:251
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sharing formula that guaranteed the players fifty-three percent of
the league's gross revenues.7 The purposes of the salary cap were to
preserve the financial integrity of the NBA and to improve the
competitive balance of the league by enabling financially weaker
teams to compete with financially stronger teams for high-priced
players.'
The players were unwilling, though, to adopt the belief ex-
pressed by the league that the rapid increase in players' salaries
was the sole, or even the principal, cause of certain NBA teams'
financial setbacks. According to Lawrence Fleischer, General
Counsel for the Players Association at the time, the players "did [,
of Understanding [, which] modified the expired 1980 collective bargaining
agreement to include, among other things, a salary cap.. . . [The parties stipu-
lated that the new agreement would govern through the end of the 1986-87 sea-
son]. On June 13, 1983, the district court approved a modification of the Robert-
son Settlement Agreement to incorporate the terms of the Memorandum of
Understanding.
Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, 675 F. Supp. 960, 963 (D.N.J. 1987).
7. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 6, § III (C)(1)(b). The following sim-
plified hypothetical shows basically how the cap works. Suppose there are ten teams in the
league and the aggregate gross revenue of those ten teams is $100 million. Fifty-three per-
cent of $100 million is $53 million, which divided by ten equals $5.3 million. Thus, under
this hypothetical, each team may spend up to $5.3 million on player salaries.
The 1983 agreement also mandated that each team have a minimum payroll equal to
approximately 90% of the team's player salary ceiling. This provision, however, has since
been altered and replaced by a complex mathematical formula that still forces the league's
member teams to spend a significant portion of the ceiling figure. Collective Bargaining
Agreement [hereinafter CBA], infra note 11, art. VII, pt. G, § 1.
This minimum spending requirement has proven to be of little practical significance, as
almost all of the individual member teams' cap-associated problems have dealt with staying
below the ceiling rather than obliging the minimum salary requirements. The minimum cap
provisions have, however, had some significance in regard to expansion franchises. (The
CBA deals with expansion teams in a special manner. CBA, art. VII, pt. G, § 1). Interest-
ingly enough, one of the few times the minimum salary provision was a factor, it resulted in
perhaps the greatest wage-related coup in the history of the NBA. The Miami Heat, an
expansion franchise that entered the league in the 1988-89 NBA season, had to spend sev-
eral million dollars in order to oblige the cap minimum prior to the 1990-91 NBA season.
John "Hot Rod" Williams, who had played the previous season for the Cleveland Cavaliers,
was a restricted free agent. Feeling that "Hot Rod" was the answer to its need for a power
forward, Miami offered him a massive multi-year contract, with a disproportionately large
amount of the salary payments being made in the contract's early years so as to make it
difficult for Cleveland to match Miami's offer. Cleveland, though, was unwilling to let one of
its brightest young players get away for nothing, and matched Miami's offer sheet pursuant
to its right of first refusal as originally laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding and
as adopted by the CBA. Thus "Hot Rod," a player who, to date, has never achieved All-Star
status, became the highest paid player in the league for the 1990-1991 NBA season, with a
salary of $5 million.
8. D. Albert Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling out
the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 122 (1986) (citing the Affidavit of Lawrence A. Fleischer at
6, at 81 Civ. 6582 (RLC) Sept. 21, 1984).
1994]
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however,] recognize that it was in their overall best interest to have
a financially stable league with as many viable franchises as possi-
ble bidding for the services of NBA players."9 The essential objec-
tives of the players in negotiating the terms of an agreement were:
(i) to maintain a system of free agency that would insure, to the
greatest extent possible, that player salaries be established at com-
petitive levels as a result of a free and open bidding system; (ii) to
strengthen the long-term financial stability of the league and pro-
tect the jobs of as many players as possible; and (iii) to provide for
some form of overall revenue sharing between the players and the
NBA teams. Both sides believed that the agreement met their
objectives.10
The Memorandum of Understanding remained in force until
the end of the 1986-87 season. On November 1, 1988, after another
session at the collective bargaining table, the league and the play-
ers slightly amended, but otherwise re-adopted, the provisions of
the Memorandum of Understanding.1
Empirical data lends support to the proposition that the sal-
ary cap has helped save professional basketball from financial ruin,
turning the NBA from a money pit into a vibrant, thriving indus-
try. 2 In 1981, only six NBA teams showed a profit, whereas by
1988, just four years after the enactment of the cap, twenty of the
9. Matter of Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations
omitted).
10. Id. at 137.
11. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association and
the National Basketball Players Association (November 1, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 CBA or
CBA] (on file with author).
12. The following figures indicate the rapid rise of the salary cap since its inception
(Recall that, pursuant to the salary cap agreement, the cap and individual player salaries
are directly proportional to the aggregate revenue of the league):
1984-85 $3.6 million
1985-86 $4.233 million
1986-87 $4.945 million
1987-88 $6.164 million
1988-89 $7.232 million
1989-90 $9.802 million
1990-91 $11.871 million
1991-92 $12.5 million
1992-93 $14.0 million
1993-94 $15.175 million
[Vol. 11:251
4
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss2/3
NBA SALARY CAP
league's twenty-three teams were able to show a profit. '" In 1981,
there were four teams for sale with no prospective buyers, and
there was talk of shrinking the league to twelve teams. Since the
advent of the cap, however, the league's financial turnaround has
been so great that during the 1980s the NBA was the only profes-
sional sports league to add expansion teams. 4
Proponents of the cap attribute the league's financial turn-
around to the fact that the cap has kept the league's most talented
players somewhat evenly distributed throughout the league, which
has enabled NBA games to be more competitive and therefore
more exciting. As a result, league attendance figures have soared."
Also, as the league has become more popular, it has become an
attractive product for major television networks. This has pro-
duced television bidding wars for the right to broadcast NBA
games at dollar amounts never before imagined.1 6
Average player salaries have risen accordingly,
Pre-Cap 1982-83 $260,000
1984-85 $325,000
1985-86 $375,000
1986-87 $440,000
1987-88 $510,000
1988-89 $600,000
1989-90 $725,000
1990-91 $925,000
1991-92 approximately $1.05 million
1992-93 approximately $1.17 million
1993-94 approximately $1.27 million
Furthermore, during the 1984-85 NBA season, only ten players earned more than $1
million, with Earvin "Magic" Johnson the highest paid at $2.5 million. In contrast, by 1990-
91 the league had nine players earning over $3 million a year, and for the 1991-92 season,
the average salary had eclipsed the $1 million dollar mark. NBA, NBA NEWS, Sept. 27, 1993,
at 4; Foraker, supra note 2, at 157.
13. Levine, supra note 2, at 96.
14. Id.
15. While the league does not make its attendance data available, the league office
does not deny that attendance has risen considerably since the inception of the cap.
This growth factor in regards to attendance is no small accomplishment when one con-
siders the current economic climate as well as the increase in the cost of a ticket to attend a
professional basketball game. Levine, supra note 2, at 95.
16. In 1989, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and the NBA entered into a
four-year, $600 million contract to televise NBA games, beginning with the 1990-91 season.
This $150 million per year price is approximately a 340% increase over Columbia Broad-
casting System's (CBS) $43.3 million per year fee it paid for the previous four seasons. Nor-
man Chad, NBC to Pay $600 Million Over Four Years to NBA, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1989,
at C1.
The cost to televise NBA games continues to rise, as the NBA has made recent deals
with NBC and TNT for $750 million and $350 million, respectively. Phil Taylor, The NBA's
Long, Cold Summer, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 18, 1993, at 32.
19941
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The league is now at a point where it is as profitable as it has
ever been, and proponents of the cap agreement credit the league's
success to the institution of the salary cap. Others maintain that it
did not really matter what agreement was struck in 1983, that the
league had already begun its turnaround, and that the credit is
more properly attributable to the arrival of Larry Bird, Magic
Johnson, and later, Michael Jordan.1 7 Nonetheless, everyone seems
to agree that the salary cap is, at least in part, responsible for the
economic resurgence of the NBA. Furthermore, this proposition is
well supported by the empirical data.
i8
17. In 1978, the Boston Celtics selected Larry Joe Bird of Indiana State University as
a junior eligible with their first round pick and the sixth pick overall of the NBA draft. In
1979, the Los Angeles Lakers selected Earvin "Magic" Johnson of Michigan State Univer-
sity with the first overall pick of the draft.
These two players, arguably two of the greatest ever to wear a pair of sneakers, cap-
tured the attention of the sports world prior to their entrance into the league when their
teams met in the final game of the NCAA tournament in 1979. Immediately following their
rookie season, the league's popularity grew, and many attribute this growth to the rivalry
between Magic and Bird. Their rivalry, one of the greatest individual rivalries in team
sports history, had everything necessary to attract maximum attention. While Bird was re-
fining his game in the rural plains of French Lick, Indiana, Johnson was polishing his skills
in the urban streets of Lansing, Michigan. When they arrived in the NBA, Bird became a
cult figure whose hard work and dedication epitomized the blue-collar attitude prevalent in
Boston, while Magic's play captured the glitter and style of Los Angeles-he was Hollywood
personified. There was something in the rivalry for everyone: white versus black; east versus
west; grit and guts versus glory; hard hat versus top hat. Furthermore, both players pos-
sessed that special dynamic something extra which enabled them to appeal to a greater
audience than is normally possible. This only served to heighten both their popularity and
the league's. See ZANDER HOLLANDER AND ALEX SACHARE, THE OFFICIAL NBA BASKETBALL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 160 (1989).
Then, in 1984, as Michael Jordan entered the league, basketball's popularity took off,
not unlike "Air" Jordan himself. According to NBA commissioner David Stern, "[the John-
son-Bird rivalry] laid the groundwork and built the momentum that made Michael Jordan
the right man in the right place at the right time." Chapin, infra note 175, at 6.
This Note does not deny the tremendous impact these special individuals had on the
game as a business, but an in-depth analysis regarding their effect is beyond the scope of
this article.
18. As far back as 1985, Commissioner David Stern was quoted as saying, "To a per-
son, the teams who understand it, recognize that it has brought a stability that is wonderful.
It has begun to blaze a trail for how you can accommodate a star system and individual
contract negotiations with a need to keep 23 or more functioning, successful entitites."
Brenner, Stern Visualizes No Problems for NBA, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 10, 1985, at 8,
col. 1. Also in 1985, Stern prophesied:
I think that the adoption of the salary cap, together with the drug program,
will some day be looked at historically as the turning point in the history of the
NBA . . . . There may be other reasons for success. But I think that when you
look at a system which has taken teams and the league itself to a point where
perhaps as many as 15 teams will be profitable, where in the year before [it was]
11 and . . . the average salary has gone from $270,000 to $330,000, you have to
scratch your head and say, "How is it possible that you had a system where it
seems that everything got better and both management and labor prospered but
[Vol. 11:251
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The salary cap agreement will remain effective through the
end of the 1993-94 season. Although most concede that the cap has
been effective in the past, many speculate that the cap, in its cur-
rent form, has outlived its usefulness. Still, few deny that some
sort of agreement must be struck, for if the league is left to pure
capitalism, it will surely fall apart. This article examines the cur-
rent issues that will be of particular interest as the current cap
expires and offers some suggestions for a new collective bargaining
agreement.
THE SALARY CAP AND ANTITRUST LAW
There is an ongoing debate as to whether the salary cap is con-
stitutional in light of antitrust law. Although the matter has been
litigated,"e and many commentators have addressed the subject,20
it remains an area of intense debate. This section will demonstrate
why the collective bargaining agreement, in its current form, does
not violate antitrust law.
The arena of professional sports represents a unique place
where two of the most basic American national policies come clash-
ing together. On one side is antitrust law, principally embodied in
the Sherman Act.21 The Supreme Court has stated that the Sher-
man Act represents "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade . . . [and] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interac-
tion of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
not at each other's expense?" I think that the salary cap, together with the profit
sharing, is responsible for that, both in fact and generally, in that they allowed
the sport to proceed.
Anthony Cotton, David Stern with NBA Ratings, Revenues Up, Commissioner Sees Resur-
gence, WASH. POST, June 23, 1985, Sports, at 1.
19. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809
F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (dismissing the claim of Leon Wood, a professional basketball player
who challenged, among other things, the salary cap provision of the collective bargaining
agreement between the NBA, its member teams, and the Players Association).
20. Levine, supra note 2; Bronstein, supra note 2; Foraker, supra note 2; Richard J.
Haray, Balancing Antitrust and Labor Policies on the Court: Wood v. National Basketball
Association, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 326 (1987).
21. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)). Section One provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states,
.is declared to be illegal."
Growing congressional concern that a few corporations were amassing significant eco-
nomic power that could be used to the detriment of the general public prompted the pas-
sage of antitrust legislation. This legislation reflected a basic extension of congressional eco-
nomic philosophy that a free market was the most efficient way to allocate resources and to
produce better goods and services at lower prices. Haray, supra note 20, at 327 n.2.
19941
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nomic resources. '22 In contrast, American national labor policy,
primarily embodied in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),23 favors collective bargaining agreements and thus main-
tains a decidedly anti-competitive focus. Reflecting the interests of
this national labor policy, there exists a labor exemption from the
antitrust laws that finds its basic source in sections 624 and 2025 of
the Clayton Act, and in sections 104, 105, and 113 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.26 These provisions declare that labor unions are
22. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
23. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). Under the NLRA, it is the declared "policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce" and when they have occurred to lessen or eradicate these problems "by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 151. Employees were
given "the right to self-organization, . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining." Id. § 157.
24. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that
the antitrust laws do not "forbid the existence and operation of labor ... organizations,"
and labor organizations and their members shall not "be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws."
25. Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States,. . . involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions
of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to
a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is
no adequate remedy at law ....
26. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, 73 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 104, 105, 113 (1982). Section 104 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute . . . from doing . . . any of the following act: (a) Ceasing or
refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; (b)
Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization, or of any employer
organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in
section 103 [nonenforceability of undertakings in conflict with public policy;
"yellow dog" contracts] of this title .
Section 105 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons
participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an
unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts
enumerated in section 104 of this title.
Section 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states:
(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the
case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or oc-
cupation; or have direct, or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of
the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization
of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more
employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associa-
[Vol. 11:251
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not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and specifi-
cally exempt certain union activities, such as secondary picketing
and group boycotts, from the coverage of the antitrust laws. 7 This
statutory labor exemption was created to insulate, and thereby
protect, legitimate collective activity by employees, 28 which al-
though inherently anti-competitive, is favored by federal labor pol-
icy.29 The exemption also extends to legitimate labor activities uni-
laterally undertaken by a union to further its own interests.3 0 It
does not, however, extend to concerted action or agreements be-
tween unions and non-labor groups. This is precisely why the con-
stitutionality of the collective bargaining agreement between the
NBA and the Players Association is debated so fiercely: it is an
tions of employees; (2) between one or more employers or association of employ-
ers; or (3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one
or more employees and associations of employees; or when the case involves any
conflicting or competing interests in a "labor dispute" ... of "persons partici-
pating or interested" therein ....
(b) a person or association shall be held to be a person participating or inter-
ested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is
engaged in the same industry therein, or is a member, officer or agent of any
association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in
such industry, trade, craft or occupation.
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.
27. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-
622 (1975).
28. The non-labor group (in this case the NBA) arguably may avail itself of the labor
exemption as well. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381
U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965). Granted, the exemption was originally created to protect unions
from the antitrust laws and was initially asserted only by unions. Later, however, employers
began to claim the exemption. Since the labor exemption extends to collective bargaining
agreements, NBA owners argue that the exemption should extend to either party to the
agreement. Courts have generally afforded management, including sports franchise owners,
protection under the exemption, reasoning that immunity must be extended to encourage
good faith bargaining by management. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904
(E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Sooper Dooper,
Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.13 (3d Cir. 1974); Phil. World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Phil. Hockey Club, Inc. 351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
The counter-argument is that the exemption should not be extended to the NBA be-
cause the exemption was created to benefit unions, and the union in this case (the Players
Association) derives no benefit from the salary cap. In the majority of instances where the
exemption was extended to employers, it was in light of an agreement that was very benefi-
cial to the union. Foraker, supra note 2, at 163. This argument, however, fails to appreciate
the benefits the salary cap has given to the Players Association. See supra notes 12-18; infra
notes 59-60, 75-80 and accompanying text; pp. 38-40; see also note 170.
29. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
30. See United States v. Hutchenson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
1994]
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agreement between a union and a non-labor group.
The Supreme Court has held that in order to properly accom-
modate congressional policy favoring free competition in business
markets with the congressional policy favoring collective bargain-
ing under the NLRA, certain union-employer agreements must be
accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanc-
tions."' The problem is defining those "certain" union-employer
agreements. When the context of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the NBA and the Players Association is taken into
consideration, it is clear that this is one of those "certain" union-
employer agreements where the balance between national labor
policy and antitrust law should weigh in favor of the national labor
policy.
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether the
product of a collective bargaining process should be held accounta-
ble to antitrust standards on three different occasions.2 In each
case, the Court determined whether or not it would grant immu-
nity by analyzing policy considerations. Thus, the Court's frame-
work, articulated by Justice White, balances labor policies against
antitrust concerns.33 Whereas labor policy has the dual goal of en-
couraging collective bargaining and advancing union interests, the
chief concern of antitrust law is to preserve competitive markets.3'
These cases provide a general rule of thumb which suggests that
where both labor policies are being advanced, market interference
will be tolerated within reason.
Incorporating the various holdings of these Supreme Court
cases, the Eighth Circuit, in Mackey v. Nat'l Football League,35
developed a three-pronged test to determine whether certain labor-
31. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 616; Local Union 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. at 729-730.
32. Connell, 421 U.S. at 616; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 676; United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
33. Daspin, supra note 8, at 101.
34. Id. at 31.
35. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (1976). In Mackey, several NFL
players filed an antitrust suit against the NFL, its member teams, and the NFL Commis-
sioner, Pete Rozelle. These players challenged the "Rozelle Rule," which required a
franchise signing an athlete who had played out his option year to compensate the athlete's
former franchise in the form of cash, player contracts, or draft choices. The players argued
that the restraint inhibited the bargaining opportunities of free agents because requiring
franchises to compensate the athlete's former franchise deterred the franchises from bidding
for the athlete's services. Conversely, the defendants argued that the nonstatutory labor
exemption immunized them from antitrust liability. The court, in holding that the Rozelle
Rule did not fall within the labor exemption, fashioned a three-part test, now commonly
referred to as the Mackey Test. Id.
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management agreements are to be afforded limited non-statutory
immunity from antitrust review:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given preeminence over the antitrust laws where
the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship. Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining
is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust
laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the
product of bona fide arm's length bargaining.8 6
If all three requirements are satisfied, the non-statutory ex-
emption applies, and the restraint is not considered an antitrust
violation.
THE LEON WOOD STORY
The Mackey Test has already been applied to the collective
bargaining agreement between the NBA and the Players Associa-
tion. In Wood v. National Basketball Association,7 the District
36. Id.
37. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Wood, Leon Wood, a highly successful college
basketball player and a member of the United States basketball team that won the gold
medal in the 1984 Olympic games in Los Angeles, brought an action, alleging that the
NBA's college draft, maximum team salary, and ban on player corporations violated Section
One of the Sherman Act. All three challenged practices resulted from the collective bargain-
ing agreement between the league and the Players Association (the 1983 Memorandum of
Understanding, supra note 6), and all three provisions were carried over into the CBA that
expired at the end of the 1993-1994 season.
Wood's claim originated when he was selected by the Philadelphia 76ers Basketball
Club (hereinafter Philadelphia or 76ers) in the NBA annual college draft on June 19, 1984.
Thereafter, Philadelphia and Wood's representative, Fred L. Slaughter, began negotiations.
Because Philadelphia was over the limit of the salary cap, they could not offer Wood the
kind of money he deserved as the 10th pick of the draft. No agreement was reached, and the
76ers offered Wood a one-year contract for $75,000-the minimum allowable offer. Philadel-
phia, however, contended that the offer was made not because of the limitations of the cap,
but rather to preserve Philadelphia's exclusive right to negotiate with Wood pursuant to
NBA regulations regarding rookie players. Philadelphia maintained they were prepared to
seek a way around the salary cap in order to negotiate a multi-year contract with Wood but
could not get Slaughter to work out the terms.
Wood declined the offer and claimed he was suffering irreparable injury by being re-
quired either to sign a one-year contract with Philadelphia at a level far below his value in
an open market or forego playing basketball in the NBA for one season. He argued that if
he were to sign at a salary not commensurate with his talents, he would be exposing himself
to a career-ending injury.
While the case was pending, the 76ers and Wood reached an agreement whereby the
76ers found a way around the salary cap to sign Wood to a four-year contract worth an
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Court for the Southern District of New York held:
The antitrust claim as to the college draft and the salary cap
provisions must fail. Both provisions affect only the parties to
the collective bargaining agreement - the NBA and the players -
involve mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by federal
labor laws, and are the result of bona fide arms-length negotia-
tions. Both are proper subjects of concern by the Players Associ-
ation. As such, these provisions come under the protective shield
of our national labor policy and are exempt from the reach of
the Sherman Act. 8
On appeal, Judge Winter, writing for the Second Circuit,
noted that if the practices in question emanated from a unilateral
agreement among the NBA member teams and not from a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with a union representing the players,
they would be illegal and Wood would be entitled to relief.39 The
court continued:
[T]he draft and the salary cap are not, however, the product
solely of an agreement among horizontal competitors but are
embodied in a collective agreement between the employer or
employers and a labor organization reached through procedures
mandated by federal labor legislation. Their legality therefore,
cannot be assessed without reference to that legislation.'
estimated $1.1 million. The 76ers accomplished this by trading Leo Rautins, and his
$155,000 salary, to the Indiana Pacers and by not re-signing veteran free agent Franklin
Edwards, whose salary had been $126,000. The 76ers thus freed up $281,000 to pay Mr.
Wood during the 1984-85 season. Four 76ers became free agents at the conclusion of the
1984-85 season. Their salaries were to be used to pay Mr. Wood for the remaining years of
his contract. Sobel, Playing with the NBA Salary Cap, 6 ENT. L. REP. No. 11 at 5 (1985).
Interestingly enough, in the year they drafted Wood, the 76ers had the 5th, 10th, and
22nd pick of the draft. With the 5th pick they selected Charles Barkley, who would go on to
become a perennial All-Star forward. With their two remaining picks, they did not fare so
well. At number 10 they selected Mr. Wood, a point guard, and with the 22nd pick they
selected Tom Sewell of Lamar, also a guard. Neither Wood nor Sewell proved to be NBA
caliber players. With the 16th pick of the draft, however, the Utah Jazz selected point guard
John Stockton, who would go on to become an eventual NBA Dream-Teamer. Meanwhile,
Leon Wood is a marginal player in the German Professional Basketball League. For more on
the uncertainties associated with the NBA draft, see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
38. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528. Regarding the ban on private corporations, also a part
of the collective bargaining agreement, the court held:
[T]he ban presents no antitrust issues. It is a restriction agreed to in labor man-
agement negotiations to simplify the union and NBA task of administering
player benefits. Even though it may have an adverse impact on some individuals
in the bargaining unit, it is not the proper subject of attack in proceedings seek-
ing relief from antitrust violations.
Id. at 529.
39. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n., 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
40. Id.
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Furthermore, Judge Winter noted that this collective bargain-
ing agreement was, at its essence, no different from collective bar-
gaining agreements in the more familiar industrial context, as both
types are the result of the same federally-mandated process. Elab-
orating on the similarities between such agreements in the world of
professional sports and in the industrial context, Judge Winter rec-
ognized they "have functionally identical and identically anti-com-
petitive, counterparts that are routinely included in industrial col-
lective agreements." Thus, the court concluded the same labor
principles should apply.41
In applying these fundamental labor principles, Judge Winter
pointed out that "[almong the fundamental principles of federal
labor policy is the legal rule that employees may eliminate compe-
tition among themselves through a governmentally supervised ma-
jority vote selecting an exclusive bargaining representative" [in
this instance the player's union]." This allows employees to seek
the best deal for the greatest number by the exercise of collective
rather than individual bargaining power. But, as Judge Winter ac-
curately concluded, this means that "[o]nce an exclusive represen-
tative has been selected, the individual employee is forbidden by
federal law from negotiating directly with the employer absent the
representative's consent, even though that employee may actually
receive less compensation under the collective bargain than he or
she would through individual negotiations."' 3 The Second Circuit
concluded that Wood was bound because "the policy claim that
one can do better through individual bargaining is nothing but the
flip side of the policy claim that other employees need unions to
protect their interest. Congress has accepted that latter position,
and we are bound by that legislative choice.""
Validating this collective bargaining agreement from yet an-
other approach, the court noted that Wood's antitrust claim was in
fundamental conflict with another prong of the national labor pol-
icy which attaches prime importance to freedom of contract be-
tween the parties to a collective agreement.4 5 This freedom of con-
tract, the court noted, is a key foundation of American national
labor policy for two reasons:
First, it allows an employer and a union to agree upon those
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
44. Id. at 961.
45. Id.
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arrangements that best suit their particular interests. Courts
cannot hope to fashion contract terms more efficient than those
arrived at by the parties who are to be governed by them. Sec-
ond, freedom of contract furthers the goal of labor peace. To the
extent that courts prohibit particular solutions for particular
problems, they reduce the number and quality of compromises
available to unions and employers for resolving their
differences.
46
In addition, the court noted that the freedom of contract is
particularly important to the collective bargaining process in the
context of professional sports, because standard industrial rela-
tions lend little or no precedent.47
Based on the aforementioned arguments, the Second Circuit
in Wood concluded that:
The interaction of the Sherman Act and federal labor legislation
is an area of law marked more by controversy than by clarity.
We need not enter this debate or probe the exact contours of the
so called statutory or non-statutory "labor exemption," however,
because no one seriously contends that the antitrust laws may
be used to subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor
policy as set out in the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.
Sections 151-169 (1982). Wood's claim is just such a wholesale
subversion of that policy, and it must be rejected out of hand.4 8
APPLICATION OF THE MACKEY TEST
In spite of the fact that the District Court in Wood applied
the Mackey Test and held that the agreement was constitutional,
and in spite of the fact that the Second Circuit 9 upheld the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the challenge to the agreement on policy
grounds, many commentators argue that the courts have erred and
that the salary cap violates antitrust law.
One such argument is that the Mackey Test, when applied
properly, dictates that the salary cap should not be exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. Specifically, this argument suggests that the sal-
ary cap fails to satisfy the first part of the Mackey Test, which
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 959.
49. Recall that it was Judge Winter who wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit. It
should be noted that the Wood case was not his first exposure to this area of the law. In
fact, Judge Winter was very experienced in this area of the law, having previously co-au-
thored an article on the subject. See Jacobs and Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
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requires "that the restraint on trade primarily affects only the par-
ties to the collective bargaining relationship. '50 Allegedly, the sal-
ary cap affects parties outside the immediate bargaining unit: the
potential first-round draft choices who are not yet members of the
NBA.51 This assertion is incorrect as a matter of law and impru-
dent when analyzed from a policy perspective. The Supreme Court
case of J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB 52 has been interpreted to mean that
"at the time an agreement is signed between the owners and the
players' exclusive bargaining representative, all players within the
bargaining unit and those who enter the bargaining unit during the
life of the agreement are bound by its terms. '53
This holding necessarily draws an analogy between the college
draft and hiring halls. Opponents of the collective bargaining
agreement contend that this analogy cannot be made. They assert
that whereas hiring halls are designed to "eliminate wasteful, time
consuming and repetitive searching for jobs by individual workmen
and haphazard uneconomical searches by employees," the player
draft and the salary cap serve no analogous purpose." Instead, it is
contended that these devices create obstacles in an adjacent prod-
uct market and impose employment barriers rather than facilitate
job searches.5 5 This argument fails to appreciate the nuances of the
player draft and the cap. The draft provides for the efficient allo-
cation of talent throughout the league in a manner that insures a
competitive balance on the court. In the absence of a collegiate
draft, a rookie player would just pick the team of his choice. As top
collegians avoided the unpopular and unsuccessful franchises, such
teams would likely fare continually worse on the court and at the
box office and eventually fold. This pattern, when repeated, could
eventually cause the demise of the entire league, as it threatened
to do in the early 1980s." The salary cap serves to ensure that free
agency does not undo the competitive equality born of the draft.
Together they are necessary and effective. The fact that they may
hurt a specific individual on rare occasions should not matter, for
that is inherent in the nature of collective bargaining. Although an
50. Daspin, supra note 8, at 113.
51. Id.
52. 321 U.S. 332 (1944). In J.I. Case Co., an employee was hired after the collective
bargaining agreement was made. The Court held that "the terms of the employee's employ-
ment already have been traded out." Id.
53. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. Daspin, supra note 8, at 115 (quoting Mountain Pacific Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Con-
tractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 n.8 (1957)).
55. Daspin, supra note 8, at 115.
56. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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individual may suffer, the agreement is designed to provide for the
good of the majority.
Opponents of the cap agreement also assert that it fails to sat-
isfy the third prong of the Mackey Test, which requires the agree-
ment be the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.5 7 The
argument is that this prong of the Mackey Test presupposes lawful
bargaining objectives, and the salary cap is a cost reduction tactic
which eliminates competition in the product market, a type of
agreement the labor exemption was never intended to immunize.58
This argument must fail for two reasons. First, it fails as a matter
of construction. The goal of the Mackey Test is to determine the
legality of an agreement, yet this argument says that this particu-
lar agreement fails to pass part three of the Mackey Test because
it is unlawful. The argument is painfully circular. Second, the sal-
ary cap is not a cost reduction tactic. The empirical evidence shows
that every year the cap has been in existence, the cap has gone up,
and as a result, in the last decade, players' salaries have risen from
an average of $260,000 in 1982-8319 to well over $1 million at the
start of the 1993-94 NBA season." The cap, which prompts parity
throughout the league, creates a situation where the league is more
competitive, hence more popular and profitable. Thus, the revenue
of the league goes up, and player salaries increase accordingly.
Therefore, it seems a rather illogical conclusion to refer to the cap
as a cost reduction tactic when the evidence suggests that average
salaries would most probably be significantly lower in the absence
of a salary cap.
Applied properly, the third part of the Mackey Test merely
requires that the agreement be negotiated by unrelated parties act-
ing in their own self-interest. The parties to the NBA collective
bargaining agreement were unrelated and acting in their own self-
interest. Thus, the district court in Wood properly held that the
NBA collective bargaining agreement was the product of bona fide
arm's length negotiating. 1
57. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
58. Daspin, supra note 8, at 117.
59. See Letter from Jeffrey Mishkin, Legal Counsel for the National Basketball Asso-
ciation, to Special Master Merrell E. Clark, setting forth the NBA's initial response to the
December 12, 1991 letter and Initial Brief submitted on behalf of Class Counsel and the
National Basketball Players Association, commencing a proceeding in which the Players ac-
cuse the NBA and its member teams of a pattern of gross violations of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, page 3 (Dec. 19, 1991) [hereinafter cited as Letter] (on file with author).
60. NBA NEWS, supra note 12, at 4.
61. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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APPLICATION OF JUSTICE WHITE'S BALANCING APPROACH
Just as some critics feel the NBA's collective bargaining agree-
ment failed to measure up to the Mackey Test, there are those who
feel the Mackey analysis should not be the decisive test in this
area. 2 Operating under the assumption that the Mackey Test rep-
resents a crude balance of divergent policy considerations that, in
relation to the salary cap, is particularly inept at striking the
proper policy balance, some maintain that the approach of the Su-
preme Court, first fashioned by Justice White in Local Union 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea,e3 is far better equipped
to handle the peculiar intricacies of the professional basketball
industry.
Justice White's framework in Jewel Tea determines whether a
union-employer agreement is to receive antitrust law immunity by
pitting labor policies against antitrust concerns. Labor policies
have a twofold concern, encouraging collective bargaining and ad-
vancing union interests, while antitrust has a singular concern,
that of preserving competitive markets.6 4 Those who would employ
this approach to strike the NBA's collective bargaining agreement
argue that the agreement eliminates competition in the market for
top-round draft choices and limits player mobility. Furthermore, it
is asserted, the salary cap is professional basketball's version of
price fixing, which in other industries has been condemned as a per
se violation of the Sherman Act."5 Thus, it is argued, the anti-coin-
62. See, e.g., Daspin, supra note 8, at 118.
63. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). In Jewel Tea, plaintiff, a meat retailer, challenged a market-
ing hours restriction incorporated in an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff was a member of a multi-employer bargaining unit of meat retailers. The defend-
ant union represented virtually all butchers in the Chicago area. During contract negotia-
tions between the two groups, defendant insisted on including the marketing hours restric-
tion in the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff claimed that the restriction violated
sections one and two of the Sherman Act by impeding his ability to compete freely and
effectively in the product market. The Supreme Court held that the marketing hours provi-
sion, obtained by the union "through bona fide, arm's length bargaining in pursuit of their
own labor union policies and not at the behest of or in combination with non-labor groups,"
was entitled to non-statutory exemption from the Sherman Act. Id. at 681.
64. Daspin, supra note 8, at 103-104.
65. There are certain trade practices that so blatantly restrain competition that they
result in a per se violation of antitrust law. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972) (division of markets); See also Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S.
207 (1959) (group boycotts); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (ty-
ing arrangements); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price
fixing). It is argued that by restraining the bidding for top round draft choices, the NBA
member teams have effectively eliminated competition inter se to reduce expenses. This
tactic is analogous to price fixing. Daspin, supra note 8, at 122.
The trend, however, is against per se applicability in professional sports because of the
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petitive repercussions of the NBA's collective bargaining agree-
ment weight the antitrust side of the scale accordingly.
Turning to the labor portion of this balancing approach, oppo-
nents of the cap feel it does not advance either of the two national
labor policies. First, they argue that it does not advance union in-
terests.6 In large part, this argument is based on the fact that the
salary cap's minimum team salary provision is based upon an ag-
gregate concept.6 7 This means that combined league payments,
rather than individual club payments, must meet the minimum
floor target of fifty-three percent of projected league revenues. Op-
ponents of the cap argue that this shift in emphasis plainly defeats
a central purpose of the salary cap-to force low-salaried clubs
into a competitive bidding posture. As a result, any incentive for
teams below cap limits to pursue high-priced free agents has been
destroyed. This argument is based on the belief that under the sys-
tem as it stands, low-salaried teams may simply look to the deep
pockets of the league's money barons to satisfy cap dictates." This
argument is theoretically correct when analyzed in a vacuum. It
fails, however, to take into consideration the fact that this is a pro-
fessional sport where each team's financial success directly corre-
lates to its on-court success. It is the desire to build a team that
can contend for a championship, not the pressure of meeting any
minimum team salary, that prompts teams to pursue valuable free
agents, and the fact that the minimum team salary provision is
now an aggregate concept will not alter this in the least.69 It is
unique nature of the profession, which requires competitors to work together in the produc-
tion of their product while remaining viciously competitive on the court. See NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984) (rule of reason approach
determined college broadcasting rights); See also Mackey v. National Football League 543
F.2d 606, 619 (1976) (per se analysis inappropriate in the context of pro sports); Philadel-
phia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-504
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (per se approach not appropriate in professional hockey); Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
990 (1984).
66. Daspin, supra note 8, at 119.
67. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. G, § 1. Section 1 provides in pertinent part
"[Tihere shall be a guaranteed Minimum Team Salary for each team designed to result in
NBA Teams being obligated to pay, in aggregate Salary and Benefits ... 53% of Defined
Gross Revenues." Id.
68. Daspin, supra note 8, at 119.
69. These assertions are based upon the author's personal knowledge. The author's
father spent ten years in the NBA, serving five years as an assistant coach, four years as a
head coach (with two separate teams), and one year as a color analyst for television and
radio broadcasts. In each situation that he has been exposed to, winning championships, not
trying to meet the cap minimum, has proven to be the preeminent factor behind player
personnel transactions. In fact, the only time money ever seemed to play a role was when
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neither fair nor accurate to characterize the NBA as a conspiracy,
with the goal being for the member teams to spend as little on
players' salaries as possible. The greatest motivation in player
transactions is the fact that on-the-court success translates into fis-
cal success, and this is what prompts teams to spend money.70
Critics also argue that the cap agreement does not advance the
the cap ceiling, not the minimum salary provision, prohibited a transaction.
70. For the upcoming 1993-94 NBA season, the salary cap has been set at $15,175,000.
As of Oct. 1, 1993 an analysis of NBA team salary reports shows that only five teams in the
league were under the cap . . .
Dallas $13,345,960
Denver $15,161,379
Minnesota $13,145,555
Philadelphia $14,480,178
Sacramento $14,998,983
National Basketball Association Player Contracts Team Summary Report [hereinafter
Player Contracts] (on file with author).
Not surprisingly, these five teams were among the league's least successful on the court
during the 1992-93 NBA season....
Team Victories Games behind division leader
Dallas 11 44
Denver 36 19
Minnesota 19 36
Philadelphia 26 34
Sacramento 25 37
THE SPORTING NEws, NBA GUIDE, 9 (1993).
In contrast, the four teams who advanced farthest in the playoffs last year will all ex-
ceed the salary cap for the 1993-94 season by an average of over $4,000,000....
New York $20,984,893
Chicago $18,931,898
Phoenix $20,069,250
Seattle $16,765,666
Player Contracts, supra.
Realizing that an NBA team's primary indicator of financial success is through box
office revenue, it is of significant interest to note that the teams who did poorly and spent
little also fared poorly in regards to attendance . . .
Team Avg. Home Attendance Capacity
Dallas 13,530 17,502
Denver 14,718 17,022
Minnesota 18,405 19,006
Philadelphia 12,568 18,168
Sacramento 17,317 17,317*
THE SPORTING NEWS, NBA GUIDE, 54-107, 176 (1993).
* It should be noted that Sacramento moved to that city from Kansas City in 1985,
primarily because demographics indicated there was such a strong demand for professional
basketball in the Sacramento area. Thus, this evidentiary anomaly should be looked at from
the perspective that Sacramento's attendance is strong in spite of their poor record.
The above represents that the five teams who are under the cap heading into the 1993-
94 NBA season left open approximately 2,495 seats per ball game last year. Contrast this to
last year's final four playoff contenders . ..
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second half of the labor scale-encouraging collective bargaining.7"
This argument is also misplaced. It concedes that the cap obvi-
ously relates to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
namely wages. Furthermore, the argument admits that in the typi-
cal industrial setting, this obvious relation would create a pre-
sumption in favor of an antitrust exemption. The sole premise for
the argument is that wage negotiation in professional basketball is
removed from the collective bargaining process as player salaries
are individually negotiated. Thus, the concerns of collective bar-
gaining are correspondingly limited. 2 This is simply wrong. One of
the basic premises of the cap is that if individual negotiations are
confined solely by the constraints of pure economics, the league
will surely tear itself apart.78 The cap agreement merely estab-
Team Avg. Home Attendance Capacity
New York 19,630 19,763
Chicago 18,528 17,339
Phoenix 19,023 19,023
Seattle 15,770 14,252
Id.
The above data represents that for each game played in these four arenas there was an
average of 16 fans who were in the building without a chair on which to sit. Of added signifi-
cance is that all of the above attendance data was for regular season games. Thus, the amaz-
ing attendance rates for the final four teams cannot be attributed to the fan frenzy associ-
ated with playoff games. One could easily assume, however, that the "standing room only"
figures rise considerably come playoff time.
The data suggests rather strongly that there is indeed incentive for teams below cap
limits to pursue high-priced quality free agents who can help a team on the court, which in
turn will lead to positive returns at the box office.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the five teams from the 1992-93 season
who were under the cap, and finished with poor records, and had poor attendance figures
(with the anomaly of Sacramento), have all offered rather impressive contracts to their first
round draft picks in what is plainly an attempt to spend significant money to improve their
on-court production . . .
Team Player Contract Terms
Dallas Jamal Mashburn Seven years, $32 million
Denver Rodney Rogers Six years, $12 million
Minnesota Isaiah Rider Seven years, $25.5 million
Philadelphia Shawn Bradley Eight years, $44.2 million
Sacramento Bobby Hurley Six years, $16.5 million
First-Round Signings, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1993, at 11H.
71. Daspin, supra note 8, at 119.
72. Id. at 119-120.
73. It should be noted that this fundamental principle is not peculiar to the NBA. It
has universal application throughout the world of professional team sports. For example, in
United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323-324 (E.D. Pa. 1953), Judge
Grim concluded, "[Tihe net effects of allowing unrestricted business competition among the
clubs are likely to be, first, the creation of greater and greater inequalities in the strength of
the teams; second, the weaker teams being driven out of business; and, third, the destruc-
tion of the entire league." Id. Likewise, in North American Soccer League v. National Foot-
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lished the parameters within which individual players can bargain
to reflect individualized variances in value, while providing protec-
tive safety restraints absent in a world of pure free agency. This
argument against the cap seems to suggest that a collective bar-
gaining agreement would be legitimate if the agreement were to
provide that every player play for the same wage. If one accepts
this proposition, how is it possible to conclude that the NBA's cur-
rent collective bargaining agreement is illegal simply because it at-
tempts to allow for variation, within the parameters of the agree-
ment, to reflect individual worth?
The truth of the matter is that both of the national labor poli-
cies in Justice White's balancing approach are being advanced by
the salary cap. These policies must be weighed against the anti-
trust concern of preserving competitive markets. The cap's critics
assert that the cap has massive anti-competitive repercussions in
that it destroys the competition in the market for top-round draft
choices and unnecessarily limits player mobility."' In analyzing
these charges, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the industry of
professional sports is unique. The normal rules do not apply. A
professional sport is unique in that its component parts, the
franchises, must cooperate to a certain extent for the sport to sur-
vive economically. A sporting event requires competition, whereas
in most industries, businesses consider competition undesirable. 75
In most professions, each firm's success comes at the expense of
other firms. In a professional sports league, however, each team's
success is dependent upon the success of the other teams in the
league.76 As Judge Grim, District Court Judge for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, eloquently explained forty years ago in one
of the first cases of this type:
[P]rofessional sports which are organized on a league basis...
[have] problems which no other [businesses have] . . .. The or-
dinary business makes every effort to sell as much of its product
or services as it can. In the course of doing this it may and often
does put many of its competitors out of business. The ordinary
ball League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982), the Second
Circuit held "[T]he economic success of each franchise is dependent on the quality of sport
competition throughout the league and the economic strength and stability of other league
members. Damage to or losses by any league member can adversely affect the stability, suc-
cess and operations of other members." Id.
For more on this point, see infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
74. Daspin, supra note 8, at 118; Bronstein, supra note 2, at 239.
75. Foraker, supra note 2, at 175.
76. Donald G. Kempf, Jr., The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional
Sports Leagues, 32 DEPAuLS L. REV. 625, 628 (1983).
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businessman is not troubled by the knowledge that he is doing
so well that his competitors are being driven out of business.
Professional teams in a league, however, must not compete too
well with each other in a business way. On the playing field, of
course, they must compete as hard as they can all the time. But
it is not necessary and indeed it is unwise for all the teams to
compete as hard as they can against each other in a business
way; the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones
into financial failure. If this should happen not only would the
weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league, both the
weaker and the stronger teams, would fail, because without a
league no team can operate profitably."
Similarly, in their treatise on sports law, Messrs. Weistart and
Lowell accurately note why the uniqueness of professional sports
leagues mandate that they be treated differently in regard to the
application of antitrust law:
[T]here is a great deal of economic interdependence among
the clubs compromising a league. They jointly produce a prod-
uct which no one of them is capable of producing alone. In addi-
tion, the success of the overall venture depends upon the finan-
cial stability of each club. The members must, therefore, refrain
from direct, interfirm economic competition and, in fact, do util-
ize various cross-subsidy devices to compensate for the natural
inequities arising from differences in the economic potential of
various franchise locations.
Since a league's member-clubs do not compete with one an-
other, it seems inappropriate to make them subject to legal prin-
ciples designed to control the behavior of firms which are funda-
mentally different. In its basic nature, the league-firm is not a
conspiracy. To treat it as such is to force results which are un-
likely to achieve any purpose intended by Congress.7 8
The bottom line is that the attraction of a phenomenal player
such as Michael Jordan would be far less if there were not five
worthy opponents on the court for him to drive past, shoot over,
and dunk on. The fact, however, that the NBA has created a situa-
tion whereby each and every night he faces the absolute toughest
competition, thereby providing him the opportunity to flash his
skills in the exciting atmosphere of a competitive basketball game,
77. Id. at 628 (citing United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323
(E.D. Pa. 1953)).
78. Id. at 629-630 (citing J.WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS, § 5.1, at 757-
58 (1979)).
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expands his marketability exponentially. 9 This example highlights
the notion that agreements limiting economic competition "are es-
sential to the effectiveness and sometimes to the existence of many
wholly beneficial economic activities," in this instance the NBA,
which on top of being a sport, is a business.80
In light of this, this article now turns to analyzing the anti-
trust concern of preserving competitive markets. The argument
against the NBA's collective bargaining agreement is that it elimi-
nates the competition for top draft choices and unnecessarily re-
stricts player mobility. Furthermore, it is analogous to price fixing.
To a certain extent, each of these complaints is true, as the draft
does eliminate competition for top draft choices, and the salary
cap does restrict player mobility and nominally is a form of price
fixing. 81 Note, however, that the antitrust concern is to preserve
competitive markets. The question we must then ask is, "Does the
NBA's collective bargaining agreement really hamper the preserva-
tion of competitive markets?" The answer, most definitely, is "no."
It is easy to hypothesize what might happen in the NBA were
there no salary cap, but this would not be a wise way of making a
decision regarding the collective bargaining agreement. There are
so many influential factors involved in determining whether or not
the league will be successful that it would be impossible to conduct
controlled studies to determine what would happen if a given stim-
ulus was introduced to or removed from the league. The most, and
possibly the only, accurate and reliable forecaster of what would
happen to the league if there were no salary cap is to examine the
history of the league. As noted earlier, prior to the introduction of
the salary cap, the league was not doing well. Now, just over a dec-
ade later, the league is experiencing success that no one previously
could have predicted. 82 Thus, history seems to suggest the salary
79. The author would like to note the recent retirement of Mr. Jordan, perhaps the
greatest ever to wear a pair of sneakers, from professional basketball. The game of basket-
ball will sorely miss him.
80. Kempf, supra note 76, at 631 (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 332
(1978)).
81. It is argued that the cap agreement represents what is referred to as "monopsony
price-fixing," where a single buyer of a product limits purchases in an effort to reduce input
costs and thereby increase profits. The NBA has a monopoly on professional basketball in
the United States. It is the only seller of professional basketball games and the only buyer
of professional basketball player services. (There are other professional basketball leagues in
the United States, but they are generally recognized as containing a caliber of player far
inferior to the NBA.) NBA franchise owners, by agreeing to limit the amount each team can
spend on player salaries, use the NBA's monopsony power to artificially limit those salaries,
thereby reducing input costs and increasing franchise profits. Foraker, supra note 2, at 171.
82. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. In addition, note the recent corn-
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cap has played a part in the league's economic success.
Refer back to the underlying antitrust concern-the preserva-
tion of competitive markets. What exactly does this mean? More
precisely, what does it mean when applied to the NBA? Does it
demand completely unrestrained free agency and the absence of a
player draft, even though this will most likely hamper the profit-
ability of the industry as a whole and ultimately threaten to de-
stroy it? Or, does it suggest a prohibition of the destruction of
competition where such destruction may lead to the possibility of
an abuse of power by management? Clearly, the spirit of the anti-
trust law dictates that the latter interpretation is the proper one.
Section One of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 8 The Supreme Court
has, however, more accurately stated the spirit of the rule by inter-
preting the Act to require that only those agreements which unrea-
sonably restrain trade are illegal.8 4 Therefore, the appropriate in-
quiry is whether the salary cap agreement unreasonably restrains
trade. It does not.
The way things are presently, it is not too far-fetched to sug-
gest that if there were no salary cap and the entire league were to
engage in a bidding war for the services of a budding young mega-
star, such as Shaquille O'Neal ("Shaq"), might sign a contract
worth well over $100 million. Under the constraints of the current
cap agreement, however, it is doubtful Shaq would be so fortunate.
Thus, it appears the anti-competitive evils of the cap are plain and
surely unreasonable. This fails to appreciate, however, that Shaq's
ability to make over $100 million on the open market today is the
direct consequence of the cap agreement. The collective bargaining
ments of Rick Welts, president of NBA Properties, the league's main marketing arm:
Most people who look at the NBA today simply can't realize what it was like in
the early 1980's. We were discussing everything from how many franchises we
might lose to whether the league itself was a viable business venture. Network
television, which has since become a major factor in the NBA's success, clearly
had its doubts. To me, the low point in our history was the 1980 Finals, when a
rookie named Magic Johnson led the Lakers to the championship, and it was
only on tape delay.
Chapin, infra note 175, at 6.
Also, note that in 1984-85 Magic Johnson was the league's highest paid player at $2.5
million. For the upcoming 1993-94 NBA season over 50 players will make $2.5 million or
more. Foraker, supra note 2, at 158; Player Contracts, supra note 70.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
84. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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agreement, via the draft and the salary cap, has created relative
parity throughout the league. In turn, this has led to competitive
games that have prompted an increase in popularity, and as the
league grows more popular, the players and owners grow ever
wealthier. The collective bargaining agreement, through its re-
straints, has created a situation whereby a player like Shaq can
mal~e an unprecedented fortune in the absence of the cap's restric-
tions. What is of key importance, however, is to realize that if the
restrictions of the cap were lifted, the ability of a player like Shaq
to land such a massive contract would be short-lived. The profita-
ble economic situation the cap has created would surely evaporate
in a relatively short period of time if the cap were removed, and
the financial situation of the league would revert to its pre-cap
days. It is even conceivable that the situation might arise where a
player as gifted as Shaq might not be able to earn even a portion
of what he now earns under the constraints of the cap, as there
might not be a profitable league for him to play in.
The essence of the antitrust question in regard to the salary
cap boils down to the following inquiry: Which of the following
scenarios is actually the one intended by the application of anti-
trust law? Scenario number one, where completely free and unfet-
tered competition leads the industry to tear itself apart and no one
makes a profit? Or, scenario number two, where, on account of
forces inherent to this unique industry, a system of semi-flexible
and reasonable restraints leads to the astronomical growth of an
industry whereby both employers and employees see their earning
capacity soar?
As applied to the NBA, the purpose of antitrust law is to pre-
vent a situation where the owners are making more than their fair
share of return at the expense of the players whose earnings are
unilaterally controlled and do not reflect the players' true value.
The salary cap is clearly within the spirit of the antitrust law. The
presence of the salary cap, not its absence, contributes to the pres-
ervation of competitive markets.
Applying Justice White's balancing approach reveals that the
collective bargaining agreement in question here advances both of
our national labor policies while it fails to adversely affect the poli-
cies advanced by antitrust law. Accordingly, the balance tips heav-
ily in favor of American national labor policies. Consequently, the
labor exemption shielded the salary cap agreement from the stan-
dards of the Sherman Act.
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THE RULE OF REASON APPROACH
Still, there remain critics of the cap who do not believe that
American national labor policy should offer collective bargaining
agreements any protection from antitrust law."5 This argument is
premised on the notion that antitrust law represents a fundamen-
tal national economic policy, a basic doctrine of economic freedom.
The Supreme Court lends some credibility to these assertions, hav-
ing referred to the Sherman Act as the "charter of economic lib-
erty."8' 6 Also, the Court has suggested that "[a]ntitrust laws in gen-
eral, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of eco-
nomic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."87
Thus, the argument is that the importance of antitrust laws,
and the Court's hesitancy to extend exemptions of these laws, dic-
tates that the conflict between labor and antitrust goals in sports
restraint cases should be reconciled in favor of antitrust laws. Ac-
cordingly, the NBA salary cap should not be exempt from antitrust
scrutiny.8 This argument fails to consider case law to the con-
trary,89 ignores national labor policy,90 and does not account for
85. Foraker, supra note 2, at 170.
86. Id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
87. Id. (quoting United States v. Topoco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
88. Id. To support his proposition Mr. Foraker relies on two Supreme Court cases
Federal Maritime Common v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); and Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973). Note, however, that both of these
cases deal with the Supreme Court analyzing collective bargaining agreements in the more
familiar industrial context and fail to consider that the industry of professional sports is
unique, which requires that it be analyzed in a unique manner in order to achieve results
which coincide with the spirit of our most fundamental national policies.
89. Wood v. National Basketball Association, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
90. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. Also, note that the codification of
the antitrust policy and the codification of our national labor policy both took place during
1982, which presupposes that Congress did not intend for one to so blatantly dominate the
other. A more accurate perspective is that both of our national labor policies must be con-
sidered in conjunction with antitrust law. Justice Frankfurter, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945), succinctly characterized
this national policy dilemma:
The result of all this is that we have two declared congressional policies
which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a
competitive business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organ-
ize to better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must
determine here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies
to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.
Id.
Even though this case deals with the more familiar industrial context, and the author is
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the fact that the business of professional sports is unique and must
be treated accordingly. Thus, its conclusion is faulty. But even as-
suming, for argument's sake, that antitrust law should dominate
and the NBA's collective bargaining agreement should be subject
to the scrutiny of antitrust law, the agreement still proves to be
constitutional.
If a collective bargaining agreement is offered no immunity to
antitrust law, it must measure up to the standards of the Sherman
Act, which states that "every contract, combination or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is
declared to be illegal."91 There are two techniques used to scruti-
nize agreements under the Sherman Act, per se treatment and the
rule of reason analysis.9 2 Per se treatment is appropriate in some
instances because there are certain trade practices that so bla-
tantly restrain competition that they result in a per se violation of
antitrust laws.9 3 This approach, however, is typically not employed
in the context of professional sports. 4 Rather, a collective bargain-
ing agreement in the context of professional sports which is offered
no immunity from antitrust law in light of labor concerns must be
analyzed under the rule of reason analysis.
The rule of reason states:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed ...
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it . . . may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that . the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable."5
critical of other commentators who apply case law regarding such industrial settings to the
unique industry of professional sports, there is no hypocrisy involved in citing the above
passage. The wise words of Frankfurter, J., above, transcend the context of the particular
case and lend themselves to general applicability anytime the two declared congressional
policies of antitrust law and labor square off against one another.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
92. Daspin, supra note 8, at 121 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958) (regarding the per se approach) and Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (regarding the rule of reason)).
93. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. at 238. It has been argued that an
integral part of the rule of reason analysis is that the restraint must be no more restrictive
than necessary. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 607, 620 (8th Cir. 1976). This
proposition is not entirely correct. The existence of a less restrictive alternative is pertinent,
but it is not the decisive factor in cases revolving around the rule of reason. National Foot-
ball League v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1079 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing from denial of cert.) ("[Tihe possibility of less restrictive alternatives is only one among
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Some commentators have suggested that an application of the
rule of reason dictates the cap agreement is unconstitutional. One
part of this argument is that one of the primary justifications of
the cap-ensuring financial stability-is not a legitimate consider-
ation under the rule of reason. 6 This conclusion, however, is wrong
as a matter of law.9 7 The second part of this argument is that it is
inappropriate to argue that the cap is necessary to provide for a
competitive balance on the playing court as this is not a proper
inquiry under the rule of reason.98 To the contrary, this must be a
consideration under the rule of reason. The Supreme Court has
many proper considerations"). See also Betassed, Inc. v. U & I Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1228-
1230 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he presence of a less restrictive alternative is a factor to be consid-
ered in the reasonableness analysis, but it is not necessarily the decisive factor"); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979) (the least restrictive
alternative is not required, but the restraint should not " 'exceed the limits reasonably nec-
essary to meet the competitive problems' [and] the existence of alternatives is obviously of
vital concern in evaluating putatively anti-competitive conduct") (emphasis in original, cita-
tions omitted) (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 365 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967),
cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980)).
96. Daspin, supra note 8, at 123.
97. This argument is based upon the decision in United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), where the Court stated "exclusion of traders from the market by
means of combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles em-
bodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving
the collaborator's profit margins or their systems ...." See Daspin, supra note 8, at 123.
Thus, it is argued that the salary cap cannot be saved by claims that the league would not
survive in its absence. This conclusion, however, is erroneous. The General Motors case
should not be relied upon in regard to this argument because it deals with the classic indus-
trial context and fails to take into consideration the all-important uniqueness of the indus-
try of professional sports. This inquiry is necessary because under the rule of reason analy-
sis, "the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied ...." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
The holding of General Motors, however, is alleged to have been adapted to the context
of professional sports by numerous other cases. See Daspin, supra note 8, at 123. These
cases, however, are clearly distinguishable as a matter of law or have been interpreted incor-
rectly. For example, Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), involved a successful claim by Spencer Haywood against the NBA's hardship
rule, which required graduating high school seniors to wait four years before becoming eligi-
ble for the NBA draft. The distinguishing factor about this case is that the court, after a
lengthy debate, concluded the per se approach was the proper method of antitrust review to
be applied to these circumstances. Thus, any holding of the court regarding the permissibil-
ity of the financial necessity argument is irrelevant. The court did, however, imply that
under a rule of reason analysis, the league's argument regarding financial necessity would be
available. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1065-66.
Similarly, in Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977), the
court held that a financial necessity argument was not available under a per se approach. Id.
at 1323. Finally, in Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), Judge Carter clearly stated that an argument of financial necessity is an appropriate
consideration under a rule of reason analysis. Id. at 892.
98. Daspin, supra note 8, at 123.
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stated that "the Court must consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied ... 
Proper application of the rule of reason to the NBA shows
conclusively that the cap does not suppress or destroy competition;
rather, it merely regulates the terms of the competition, thereby
promoting it. The cap restrains competition for high draft picks,
reduces player mobility, and limits player salaries. In doing so, the
cap creates a situation whereby the "restrained salaries" are
greater than the salaries would be if the regulations were removed.
The cap provides for a healthy, thriving industry that assures that
those involved will be rewarded handsomely. Thus, the NBA's col-
lective bargaining agreement obliges the rule of reason.
ANTITRUST LAW CONCLUSION
Under the three-part test of Mackey, the NBA's collective
bargaining agreement proves to be constitutional. Likewise, apply-
ing Justice White's balancing approach shows that the agreement
is constitutional. Even assuming the cap is awarded no antitrust
immunity whatsoever, it meets the requirements of the rule of rea-
son and hence, it proves to be constitutional. The only antitrust
analysis which would invalidate the agreement-the per se ap-
proach-is inapplicable. As a matter of law, the collective bargain-
ing agreement between the NBA and the Players Association is a
legal agreement.
THE FUTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NBA
The collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and
the Players Association expires at the end of the 1993-1994 season.
While the league has encountered great success while under the
salary cap regulations, there are many problems associated with
the cap. These problems suggest that the next collective bargaining
agreement, if one can be agreed upon, will be markedly different.
The remaining sections of this work will address these problems
associated with the cap's future, speculate as to how they will af-
fect the continued existence of the cap, and make some suggestions
as to how the parties should respond.
99. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The argument
also rests upon two other cases which allegedly reject the permissibility of the competitive
balance argument. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976);
Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). An accurate analysis of these cases,
however, reveals that the competitive balance argument is not prohibited from being made,
but, rather, that it will not legitimize an agreement that is otherwise unreasonable.
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The Dudley Deal
One of the major complaints about the provisions of the salary
cap is the manner in which they restrain player mobility. Obvi-
ously, this frustrates players who would like some freedom to
choose where they play. This problem has become an even greater
headache for team general managers. There was once a time when
a trade meant little more than an evaluation of players' playing
ability. For example, Player X and Player Y are of relatively equal
caliber. So, Team 1 sends Player X to Team 2 in exchange for
Player Y. The deal is simple. No hassles. Today, however, things
are much more complicated because of the salary cap.
To begin to understand the complications created by the sal-
ary cap, an analysis of the once-simple Player X for Player Y sce-
nario will prove useful. Under the cap, if two teams are paying sal-
aries in excess of the cap, they may trade players only if the
players are of almost equal value in terms of salary. 100 Accordingly,
if the deal is between a team over the cap and a team under the
cap, the deal can only be done if the team who is over the cap is
receiving a player who makes less money or an amount roughly
equal to the amount they paid their former player. 1' 1
Now, suppose there is a player who at some point during his
career has an increase in salary of more than thirty percent. Such a
player is referred to as a base year compensation player. 0 2 Fur-
ther, suppose that the team employing that player is above the cap
and wishes to trade him to another team at or above the cap. The
team desiring the trade will only be allowed to do so if the player
they trade him for is a player who makes what the base year com-
pensation player made in his base year of compensation (the year
before his salary increased by more than thirty percent) or less. 03
100. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. F, § 1(e)(1-2). Section 1(e)(1-2) provides in per-
tinent part:
(e) A Team with a Team Salary at or over the Salary Cap may replace a player
whose Player Contract has been assigned to another NBA team:
(1) With one or more players whose Player Contracts are acquired
simultaneously and whose then current Salaries, in the aggregate, are
no more than 110% of the then current Salary of the player being
replaced ...
(2) With one or more player whose Player Contracts in the aggregate
call for Salary no greater than 100% of the Salary last paid to the
player being replaced.
Id.
101. Id.
102. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. F, § 2.
103. Id. This provision has proven very restrictive indeed. For example, prior to the
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Clearly, the salary cap has made it very difficult to conduct a trade
considering that almost all of the teams in the league are at or
above the cap.'"
The salary cap also has significant ramifications regarding the
signing of free agents. In order to understand this fully, it is first
necessary to understand the distinctions between the two types of
free agents. Generally, a restricted free agent is a veteran player
who has played in the league for less than four years and has satis-
fied the terms of his player contract. Also, any player who has just
completed his first player contract will be a restricted free agent,
regardless of the number of years of service in the NBA. 05 All
other veteran players, at the expiration of their player contracts,
become unrestricted free agents.06 Any team is free to offer an
unrestricted free agent any amount of money as long as it can fit
his salary under its cap. 07
The manner in which the cap addresses restricted free agents
is rather interesting. Basically, the cap dictates that the team for
whom the restricted free agent last played can re-sign that player
at any price, irrespective of the salary cap. 08 This provision is
based on the notion that a team that has benefitted from a certain
player in the past has a reliance interest in that player. Thus, in
1992-93 NBA season, the Detroit Pistons, who were over the cap, wished to trade John
Salley, who made roughly $2 million. Salley, however, was a base year compensation player
earning $615,000. Thus, the Pistons could only trade him for a player who made $615,000,
and they had to do this with a team that could fit Salley's current salary of $2 million under
the cap. Understandably, the Pistons encountered great difficulty in trying to move Salley.
Eventually, however, they were able to trade Salley to the Miami Heat, which could accom-
modate Salley's salary. In return, the Pistons got a future draft pick, less than the $615,000
they had room for.
With that pick, the Pistons selected Lindsey Hunter from Jackson State. With the
money they cleared from unloading Salley, the Pistons were able to sign Terry Mills, who
was a restricted free agent. Thus, the ultimate deal turned out to be Salley for Mills and
Hunter.
104. Twenty-two of the League's 27 teams were at or above the cap as of Oct. 1, 1993.
Player Contracts, supra note 70.
105. CBA, supra note 11, art. V, § 1.
106. CBA, supra note 11, art. V, § 2.
107. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. E, § 1(a).
108. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. F, § l(d). Section 1(d) provides in pertinent
part:
(d) A Team may enter into any new Player contract with or, where applicable,
exercise its Right of First Refusal with respect to, any Veteran who completes
the playing services called for under his Player contract and who has previously
played for that Team, even if such Team has a Team Salary in excess of the
Salary Cap or such Player Contract causes the Team to have a Team Salary in
excess of the Salary Cap.
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drafting the collective bargaining agreement, the parties decided it
would harm the league if a team could have one of its players,
upon whom it relies, simply swept away by a higher bidder. This
notion is consistent with the general principle behind the cap,
which limits the ability of teams to buy high-caliber players away
from other teams. This salary cap provision thus allows teams who
are capped to prevent this from happening by permitting them to
exceed the cap in order to protect their own players.
Typically, this provision applies when a restricted free agent is
tendered an offer by a team other than the team with which the
player last played. Pursuant to the right of first refusal, the team
who last enjoyed the benefits of that player could then match the
offer and thus retain the services of that player, even if it meant
placing the team over the cap.109 Consistent with the policy favor-
ing the ability of teams to protect reliance interests they may have
in their players, there also exists a provision which allows a team
to enter the bidding war for an unrestricted free agent, who last
played for that team, regardless of cap concerns. 110 When dealing
with unrestricted free agents, however, there is no right of first re-
fusal. Thus, a team is not assured of retaining the services of an
unrestricted free agent even if it is willing to match the highest
offer.
In light of all the restrictions that these provisions place upon
player movement, player agents and general managers have begun
to employ a creative practice which enables them to circumvent
the spirit of the cap. This technique can best be understood by
analyzing the example of Chris Dudley.1 Chris Dudley was a six-
year veteran player who completed a three-year contract with the
New Jersey Nets on June 30, 1993, which made him an un-
restricted free agent. His salary in 1993 was $1,200,000. He had
been a valuable player for the Nets, but not a starter. Pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement, New Jersey was not limited by
the salary cap with respect to Dudley and made him an offer of a
109. The right of first refusal refers to a team's right to match the offer of another
team trying to court a restricted free agent. CBA, supra note 11, art. V, § 3.
A classic example of a team using the right of first refusal to re-sign one of its own
restricted free agents, although doing so would place them over the cap, is the scenario
involving the Miami Heat, the Cleveland Cavaliers, and John "Hot Rod" Williams. See
supra note 7.
110. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. F, § 1(d).
111. In Re National Basketball Players Association, Petitioners and National Basket-
ball Association, Respondents. Re: Chris Dudley. Case No. 87-4001 CIV., 8 (D.N.J. 1993) (on
file with author) [hereinafter cited as Special Master Report #28].
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seven year contract worth $20,748,000.112 Dudley rejected the offer,
which was then withdrawn by New Jersey, although there is evi-
dence that it, or something close to it, would have been available if
Dudley had showen serious interest. 1 8
Meanwhile, Dudley had begun negotiations with the Portland
Trailblazers. Dudley found this team particularly attractive be-
cause it was of championship caliber, it had no natural center, the
team played a style of basketball that he thought would "show-
case" his skills, and it was located on the West Coast where he
lived.11 4 Portland, however, had no room under its salary cap, and
having enjoyed tremendous success over the last four years, 1" the
team was hesitant to do any major re-shuffling with its roster so as
to find enough room (money) under the cap with which to offer
Dudley a sizable contract." 6
Portland did, however, trade a lesser veteran player, Mario
Elie, to open up a $790,000 slot under the cap." 7 Portland realized
that a contract worth only $790,000 in Year One would be of little
interest to Dudley, who was receiving offers from other teams for
significantly more money." 8 In light of the situation, Portland of-
fered Dudley the best contract it could: $790,000 in Year One fol-
lowed by a thirty percent raise each year-which is allowable
under the cap 1 1 -for seven years.120 Dudley accepted the con-
112. Id., at 8. The proposed yearly salaries for Dudley were as follows:
1993-94 $1,560,000
1994-95 $2,028,000
1995-96 $2,496,000
1996-97 $2,964,000
1997-98 $3,432,000
1998-99 $3,900,000
1999-2000 $4,368,000
Total $20,748,000
The first six years of the contract were to be fully guaranteed and the seventh year was
partly guaranteed. Id.
113. Id. at 9.
114. Id.
115. Over the past four seasons (1989-90 through 1992-93), the Blazers have gone to
the Western Conference Finals three times, and twice they have gone on to the NBA finals.
Id. at 9.
116. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 9.
117. Id.
118. Id. On top of the seven-year, $20,748,000 contract New Jersey had offered Dud-
ley, Phoenix was rumored to have spoken with Dudley about a six-year contract worth
$19,842,000. No firm offer, however, was made. Id.
119. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. E, § 2(c).
120. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 9-10. The proposed yearly salaries
were as follows:
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tract.12' Granted, the seven year, $10,512,000 contract was worth
only about one-half as much as the contract that Dudley was of-
fered by the Nets, but there was an important, additional provi-
sion-a one-year out.122 This "out" would give Dudley the right to
become an unrestricted free agent after only one year. If he did opt
out, Portland would be able to pay him without regard to the sal-
ary cap because Portland would then be the team for whom Dud-
ley last played.'
Based on the fact that the contract with Portland was both
low in salary compared to Dudley's "market value," and included
the option to become an unrestricted free agent after only one
year, the NBA claimed the contract violated the spirit of the salary
cap and was therefore illegal.12" The league then invalidated the
contract, and the Players Association responded by commencing
judicial action.
The league was of the opinion that Portland and Dudley
crafted a plain, under-the-table deal in an effort to circumvent the
salary cap. 125 In the league's determination, Portland had courted
Dudley by promising him that if he would sign a contract with the
team in which he would take a significant loss in salary for one
year, it would include in the contract a clause allowing him to be-
come a free agent after one year. Then, no longer bound by the cap
in regard to Dudley, it would offer him a new contract in which it
would more than make up for the lack of compensation earned in
1993-94 $ 790,000
1994-95 $ 1,027,000
1995-96 $ 1,264,000
1996-97 $ 1,501,000
1997-98 $ 1,738,000
1998-99 $ 1,975,000
1999-20 $ 2,212,000
total $10,512,000
Id. at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. F, § 1(d).
124. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 10.
125. The league was relying on the decision of Judge Carter of the District Court in
the Southern District of New York invalidating the player contract of then-New York Knick
Albert King. Matter of Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In that
case Judge Carter held:
[P]layers cannot be allowed to structure salary contracts which, although artifi-
cially and formally within salary cap limitations, void the provisions designed to
protect the NBA's interests. By sanctioning such empty formalism we would
buttress the players' interests, but would leave the league in shambles.
Id. at 141.
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Year One. The league took the position that:
[A] team wishing to hire a player with a market value higher
than is available under its salary cap should make roster moves
to provide room under the cap. It should not avoid the cap by
paying a low salary for one year, allowing the player to opt out
and then renegotiate a new salary free of the cap.""8
Various portions of the collective bargaining agreement seem
to suggest that the contract in question is illegal. For example, Ar-
ticle VII, Part H, Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement
is as follows:
Section 3. Neither the parties hereto, nor any team or player
shall enter into any agreement, Player contract, Offer Sheet or
other transaction which includes any terms that are designed to
serve the purpose of defeating or circumventing the intention
. . . [of the salary cap]. 2 '
Similarly, Article VII, Part H, Section 4 of the agreement
states:
Section 4. (a) At the time a Team and a player enter into
any Player Contract, or any renegotiation, extension or amend-
ment of a Player Contract, there shall be no undisclosed agree-
ments of any kind, express or implied, oral or written, or
promises, undertakings, representations, commitments, induce-
ments, assurances of intent or understandings of any kind, be-
tween such player and any Team:
(2) concerning any future renegotiation, extension or
amendment of the player contract.12
Note, however, that the collective bargaining agreement does
not explicitly state that a one-year out provision in a multi-year
contract is illegal. Section 4 states that an under-the-table agree-
ment is illegal. The problem is that it is nearly impossible to prove
the existence of an under-the-table agreement. Similarly, Section 3
states that cap circumvention is illegal, but it does not suggest that
a one-year out provision in a multi-year contract is per se cap
circumvention.
The Dudley case was decided by a Special Master, pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement.12  Two basic issues were
126. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 11.
127. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. H, § 3.
128. Id. § 4.
129. CBA, supra note 11, at art. XXVIII. It should also be noted that Dudley's con-
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before the Special Master. First, did an illicit agreement exist be-
tween Dudley and the Trailblazers? 1 ° The second issue was
whether Dudley's multi-year contract with a one-year out
clause-the exercising of which would make him a free
agent-constituted cap circumvention. 8' This latter question is of
tremendous significance to the future of the NBA. If one-year out
provisions in multi-year contracts are legitimized, it will threaten
to undo all the cap has accomplished because, in essence, the
league will revert to a system where teams can simply buy the best
players. Granted, they will have to do so indirectly, via contracts
containing one-year out provisions, but it will have the same
effect." 2
tract was not the only one to be decided by this case. Craig Ehlo, formerly of the Cleveland
Cavaliers, recently entered into a contract with the Atlanta Hawks that contained a one-
year out provision. European star Toni Kukoc had done the same with the Chicago Bulls.
The Dudley case was to decide the fate of these two contracts, as well as Dudley's. Special
Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 4 5.
Since this litigation commenced, the top pick of the 1993 NBA draft, Chris Webber of
the Golden State Warriors, signed a massive 15-year, $74.4 million contract which also con-
tained a one-year out provision. In spite of the massive value of the contract, Webber might
choose to exercise the out provision since in the first year of the contract he will only earn
$1.6 million and $2.08 million in year two, salaries far below what a number one pick should
command. Webber's contract, however, will increase by the permissible amount of thirty
percent from season to season so that in the final year of the contract he will make over $8
million. Webber still may opt out in order to earn more money up front. Server, supra note
1, at 89. Webber was joined by fellow rookie Anfernee Hardaway, who signed a similar 13-
year, $65 million deal with the Orlando Magic, which also includes a one-year out provision.
Id. These contracts, however, were signed after this litigation had commenced and thus were
not ruled upon by the special master. Consequently, the ultimate outcome of this case will
not directly affect the validity of these contracts.
130. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 6-7.
131. Id.
132. Those who support one-year out provisions as a legitimate tool in negotiating
player contracts argue that they will not destroy the league because they will only apply to
free agents. This argument, however, fails to note that at the close of every season, numer-
ous players of significant value bpcome free agents. For instance, at the close of the 1992-93
NBA season the following players became unrestricted free agents:
Chris Dudley Kevin Edwards Craig Ehlo
A.C. Green Avery Johnson Larry Krystkowiak
Jerome Lane Andrew Lang Ken Norman
Donald Royal Charles Smith David Wingate;
and the following players became restricted free agents:
Anthony Bonner Elden Campbell Doug Christie
Matt Geiger Keith Jennings Marcus Liberty
Robert Pack Will Perdue Bobby Phills
Jerome Richardson Rick Smits.
Clearly, this represents a large enough talent pool to significantly affect the league. Memo-
randum from Jeffrey Mishkin to NBA General Managers (April 20, 1993) (on file with
author).
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Dudley Before the Special Master
The Special Master refused to accept the NBA's contention
that a secret understanding in violation of the CBA existed be-
tween Dudley and Portland.133 At trial, anyone who might have
known about such an illicit agreement testified that such an agree-
ment did not exist. Based on this testimony the Special Master
decided the existence of such an agreement had not been estab-
lished. 1 4 Rather, the Special Master stated:
I do not find the suggested inference compelling. As indi-
cated above, the explanations given by Dudley for accepting the
Portland offer are to me reasonable and plausible in view of his
circumstances and career ambitions. The opportunity to be a
starting center, plus his "fit" into the Portland style of play,
plus Portland's championship caliber, plus the team's location
on the West Coast, plus the one-year out with its opportunity to
be rewarded for a good playing year - all these fully explain his
acceptance of the contract without any secret understanding as
to future compensation."3 "
Regarding the more important issue of whether the Dudley
Portland contract constituted illegal cap circumvention, the Spe-
cial Master ruled in favor of the contract. He concluded this con-
tract was not empty formalism as there were important substan-
tive results for the player and for the team.' The Special Master
did make a point of noting that the salary cap has appeared to
benefit the league, stating, "It appears to have contributed to its
[the league's] financial stability and to have put the teams on a
At the close of each season, a similar talent pool would then have the option of signing
contracts containing one-year out provisions. Likewise, rookie draft picks would have the
option to sign such contracts. Thus, teams drafting top draft picks will not really be bound
by the constraints of the cap when they sign their top rookies. In fact, this practice has
already begun as both Chris Webber, Golden State's prize rookie, and Anfernee Hardaway
of Orlando have signed such contracts. See supra note 129.
All players in situations similar to those just listed will continue to have the option of
signing contracts containing one-year out provisions, even if the NBA and the Players Asso-
ciation cannot agree on a new collective bargaining agreement. See infra, notes 161-164 and
accompanying text.
133. According to the NBA, the Dudley/Portland deal "in the light of at least one
other offer made to Dudley, simply defies all reason - but for one." Special Master Report
#28, supra note 111, at 17 (citations omitted).
134. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 18. At trial, however, one man,
Richard Dozer of the Phoenix Suns, stated that during a phone call between him and Fagan
[Dudley's agent], Fagan had inferred that there was such an agreement. The Special Master
did not credit this testimony. Id.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Id. at 13.
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more equal footing so far as bidding for players is concerned.' ' 13 7
Incredulously, though, the Special Master concluded that "[i]t
does not seem to me, however, that the Dudley contract and others
like it pose any threat to these benefits."' 3 8 It should be noted
that, in great part, the Special Master's decision to validate this
contract was based on the fact that he had previously held that the
collective bargaining agreement contemplated options in favor of a
player to shorten a contract.139 The Special Master stated:
Numerous examples have been cited to me of such options
in contracts approved by the NBA. They include options after
two or more years in multiyear contracts and one-year outs in
two year contracts. I am unable to accept the proposition that a
one-year out in a contract of more than two years is so different
in substance as to constitute cap circumvention. "4 0
This holding, which allows for one-year outs in multi-year con-
tracts, threatens to have a massive, negative effect on the league's
financial stability. There is some question whether such an impor-
tant decision should be based upon the Special Master's inability
to distinguish between the contract at issue and numerous other
contracts currently existing in the league that are agreed by all to
be legal, particularly when historical analysis reveals that these
"numerous other contracts" are merely the result of happenstance
and not the rationalized products of in-depth salary cap
scrutiny.'"
137. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 15.
138. Id.
139. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 14. In upholding the validity of
these other option clauses, the Special Master relied upon two provisions within the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Article VI, Section 1 of the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vides, "Any Player Contract may contain an option in favor of the player." CBA, supra note
11, art. VI, § 1. Article VII, Part B, Section 2(a), dealing with signing bonuses, recognizes
that there may be a player contract which "provides for an option by the player either to
increase or shorten the stated term of the Player Contract." CBA, supra note 11, art. VII,
pt. B, § 2(a).
140. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 14.
141. The Special Master's decision boils down to a quasi-estoppel argument which as-
serts that because similar provisions currently exist in numerous contracts never subject to
challenge by the league, the league may not challenge this provision as it is not sufficiently
distinguishable. An analysis of the evolutionary process which has given birth to the termi-
nation provision in question reveals how unjust it is that the Special Master's far-reaching
decision is based upon this quasi-estoppel argument.
There is a long history leading up to the current controversy involving the Dudley/
Portland contract. The league has always frowned upon termination provisions within
player contracts, primarily because it is not overly pessimistic to conclude that these provi-
sions are typically associated with illegal side agreements which are terribly difficult to pro-
hibit. The success of the salary cap is contingent upon the construction of a group of well-
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Toward the end of oral argument, in response to the argu-
followed rules. Granted, there are draconian punishments involved when a party is found to
have violated the rules, but the cap's success is necessarily tied to people abiding by the
rules. It would undermine the cap's underlying purposes to have a set of rules that are easily
violated, especially when one is dealing with a group of people who are highly motivated to
do so. Hence, the league has traditionally frowned upon termination provisions. Such provi-
sions, however, were not explicitly declared illegal within the collective bargaining agree-
ment for a number of reasons.
In order for a player and a team to successfully engage in an illegal side agreement,
without it being against league policy, it must, by its nature, be unwritten and undisclosed.
Thus, in a purely legal sense neither party, player or team, is bound by the terms of an
illegal agreement, e.g., a promise to renegotiate in terms favorable to the player. Necessarily,
the probability of such agreements actually coming to fruition decreases as the number of
years passes between the initial agreement and the date of termination.
Also, there are a certain legitimate justifications for desiring a termination provision.
For example:
(1) Provisions for termination in the later years of a contract allow the player
and the team to re-analyze and conform a player's compensation to the then
current market.
(2) A player may not want to commit to a certain team for an extended period of
time for a number of reasons:
(a) Personality conflicts between the player in question and other
players, coaches or management;
(b) Geographical considerations;
(c) Quality of the team. For instance, a player in the twilight of his
career may be hesitant to lock in with a poor team for the rest of his
career knowing this may prevent the player from ever being on a
championship team; or
(d) A young player may be hesitant to lock himself into a long term
contract at a certain compensation if the player anticipates marked
improvement in his skills which in a few years would warrant signifi-
cantly greater earnings that the player is currently being offered.
This non-exclusive list of justifications for termination provisions serves to demonstrate
that a termination provision does not necessarily mean a team is trying to circumvent the
salary cap. The problem is that it is easy to see where the line begins to grow blurry, and it
is not so easy to tell what is a legitimate consideration and what is an attempt to circumvent
the cap. Nonetheless, in the early years of their existence, termination provisions were typi-
cally employed in the later years of multi-year contracts for what appeared to be legitimate
considerations. The league thus concluded that the risk-reward ratio of termination provi-
sions dictated that it was not worth prohibiting such provisions when they took place in the
later years of a contract. As such, such provisions were not explicitly outlawed under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The termination provision issue moved into the next era with the close of the 1990-91
NBA season when John Battle, a five-year NBA veteran who had spent his entire career to
that point with the Atlanta Hawks, became an unrestricted free agent. Battle, a fairly
sought-after free agent who had averaged almost 14 points per game the prior year, then
entered into negotiations with the Cleveland Cavaliers. For various reasons that the league
never questioned as illegitimate, the Cavaliers and Battle sought to enter into a six-year
deal in which Battle would have the opportunity to opt out following any year after the
second year. Although the league did not believe the Cavaliers and Battle were engaging in
prohibited activities, the league was not pleased with the proposed contract because of its
inherent disdain for termination provisions in general.
At the time, Gary Bettman, one of the chief architects of the cap, was the NBA's gen-
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ments made by Dudley's counsel, which were eventually accepted
by the Special Master, the league raised a new contention: "If as
claimed by Dudley, Portland and the Players, the one year out
provision had value, then such value should be added to Dudley's
salary for salary cap purposes thus putting the Dudley/Portland
contract over the cap.14
2
eral counsel. Bettman was generally regarded as one of the foremost authorities when it
came to interpreting the cap. In fact, because of his ability to interpret the salary cap,
Bettman was referred to as "God" by more than one general manager. Gary Binford,
Wolves' Bailey is a Real Pearl, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 1992, at 70. As the salary cap
was unique and unlike any other agreement in professional sports history, a number of in-
stances arose where the text of the agreement did not explicitly dictate how to handle the
given situation, and there was no historical framework to provide guidance. Thus, Bettman,
in many instances, single-handedly shaped the dictates of the cap by making judgment calls.
In this instance, Bettman informed the parties he would permit a termination provi-
sion, but it would have to be set in advance at a specifically chosen year. Bettman would not
allow the contract to provide Battle the opportunity to opt out after each season following
year two of the contract. In light of this decision, the parties elected to place the termina-
tion provision after Year Three. Thus, at the close of the 1993-94 season Battle had the
option to explore free agency. Year Three was chosen because it coincided with the year the
collective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire, and it seemed to Battle and his
representative like a good time to explore free agency.
There does not appear to be any significant reason why Bettman came to his decision.
This author feel that Bettman allowed the parties to make use of the termination provision
because he had the utmost confidence in their ethical integrity, yet he would not allow a
termination provision following every season after Year Two because of the general policy
considerations against termination provisions. So, in an attempt to be fair, he struck what
he thought was an equitable balance.
This seemingly arbitrary decision, however, has proven to be of marked significance.
The Battle contract has become a watershed contract and, since its inception, many teams
and players have made use of similar provisions. Yet, no one had ever sought to place a
termination provision after the first year of a multiyear contract until now. It is quite bi-
zarre, but Bettman's somewhat arbitrary decision back in 1991 seems to be the primary
justification for recognizing the legality of a one-year out provision like the one in the Dud-
ley contract, as the Special Master's decision is strongly premised upon his inability to dis-
tinguish between the one-year out in question and the other termination provisions in con-
tracts born of the Battle deal. It seems that with so much at stake, the deciding factor
should not be the arbitrary judgment call of one man several years ago, especially when he
could not have foreseen the magnitude of his decision.
** This information is based upon privileged information obtained through confidential
sources.
142. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 20. The Special Master validated
this contract because he found that Chris Dudley will receive, in Year One of the Portland
deal, $790,000, as compared to the $1,560,000 he would have received from New Jersey. The
Special Master, however, also found a host of positive intangibles associated with the Port-
land deal, which might lead Dudley to accept that deal in the absence of an illegal under-
the-table agreement. The Special Master defined the intangibles as: the opportunity to start
and showcase his skills; Portland's style of play, which Dudley believes will suit him well;
the fact that Portland is of championship caliber; the team's location; and, most impor-
tantly, the one-year out, with its opportunity to be rewarded with a new and improved
contract (which could come from any team in the league, as he will be an unrestricted free
agent, but only the Trailblazers will be able to sign him irrespective of cap considerations)
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Initially, the Special Master conceded "the contention has at
least surface plausibility" because salary is defined in Article VII,
Part A, Section 1(c) as "compensation in Money, Property and In-
vestments or anything else of value.'"1 4  The Special Master, how-
ever, was not willing to decide on this issue without further brief-
ing and argument. 4 He did, however, schedule a further hearing
on that issue, and on September 24, 1993, he heard argument and
received documentary evidence.145 On September 28, 1993, the
Special Master issued his Report #29 in which he concluded that a
one year out is not "compensation" under Article VII, Part A, Sec-
tion l(c).146
Dudley Before the District Court
The NBA appealed the Dudley case to the United States Dis-
trict Court of New Jersey.1 7 In his opinion, Judge Debevoise ad-
dressed three issues, the first of which was whether the Special
Master erred in finding that there was no agreement or under-
standing in violation of Article VII, Part H, Section 4.148 Before
Judge Debevoise, the NBA slightly altered its argument, stressing
"that Section 4's prohibition of 'assurances of intent, or under-
standings of any kind' covers the obvious intent of both Dudley
and Portland to renegotiate after one year free from the restraints
of the salary cap. ' 149 Judge Debevoise, however, was not persuaded
and adopted the Special Master's Report on this issue. 50 Judge
Debevoise also adopted Special Master Report #29, stating that
should he perform well. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 17.
The league contends that the intangibles should be given a dollar value and counted for
cap purposes. The dollar value attributed to the intangibles would be the difference between
the monetary value between the offer the player wishes to accept and the highest offer made
by another team. In this instance, that would amount to the difference between Portland's
$790,000 and New Jersey's $1,560,000, equalling $770,000. Thus, the Portland contract for
Year One would be, for cap purposes, worth $790,000 (salary) plus $770,000 (intangibles)
equalling $1,560,000. Because Portland only had $790,000 under the slot, pursuant to Article
VII, Part F, Section 1(b)(1)(ii), the contract would be illegal.
143. Special Master Report #28, supra note 111, at 20-21 (emphasis in original).
144. Id.
145. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, 838 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D.N.J.
1993).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 174. The standard of review was such that the district court was to "accept
the Special Master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and the Special Master's rec-
ommendations of relief unless based upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, incorrect appli-
cation of the law or abuse of discretion." Id. at 180 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b)).
148. Id. at 172.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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one-year out provisions in multi-year contracts are not compensa-
tion and should be given no value for the purpose of computing
salary cap compliance.1"'
Judge Debevoise then turned his attention to the issue of
whether the Dudley/Portland contract constitutes salary cap cir-
cumvention in violation of Article VII, Part H, Section 3 of the
collective bargaining agreement. 1 2 Judge Debevoise began by stat-
ing his opinion "that the Special Master unduly minimizes the ad-
verse effects a one-year opt out will have upon the teams' objective
of controlling maximum salaries which can be paid under the
BSA."'"5 Judge Debevoise noted the Special Master refused to ac-
cept the proposition that a one-year out in a contract of more than
two years is so different in substance from an option after two or
more years in a multi-year contract and one-year outs in two year
contract as to constitute cap circumvention.'" Judge Debevoise
then criticized the Special Master, and, in the process, eloquently
expressed the proper perspective:
To me it seems that the length of time before a player can
exercise an option can have a substantial impact on the teams'
objective of establishing maximum team salaries. If the option
cannot be exercised until after the sixth year of a seven year
contract the impact would be minimal. If the option could be
exercised a month after entering into the contract, the objective
of maintaining team maximum salaries would be totally de-
feated. Lines have to be drawn and it would be a mistake to too
readily equate the kinds of options which the NBA has ap-
proved in the past and the option at issue here. The impact on
maximum team salaries could be quite different.15
Still, Judge Debevoise could not ignore the fact that nothing
in the collective bargaining agreement explicitly excluded a one-
year termination option." Thus, he found that while certain pro-
visions do suggest that one year is perhaps the minimum length of
time before a contract can be modified or terminated, a one-year
option is within the contemplation of the parties.' 57 As such, Judge
151. Id. at 181.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 182. The term BSA refers to the Bridgeman Settlement Agreement which
was a precursor to the current collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 6.
154. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, 838 F. Supp. 172, 183 (D.N.J.
1993).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. In Particular, Judge Debevoise referred to Article VII, Part F, Section 7(d)
which provides:
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Debevoise concluded that "even though one-year out provisions in
multiyear contracts may have a presently unascertainable adverse
effect on the very legitimate objectives of the salary cap, Dudley's
contract is not in violation of [the salary cap]." 158
As of this writing, the NBA is in the process of appealing to
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit should reverse the decision of the district court
and invalidate this contract. It would be a mockery of justice to
rely upon the rationale behind the decision of the Special Master,
as his conclusion was grounded in a reliance upon historical hap-
penstance rather than the appropriate degree of inquiry required
by a matter of this importance. Judge Debevoise was clearly dis-
turbed by the lack of logic associated with the Special Master's
decision and argued at length in favor of striking down the Dudley
contract, but he did not have the courage to do so because it was
not explicitly prohibited in the collective bargaining agreement.
Nonetheless, it is clear that certain portions of the cap agreement
were intended to prevent creation such a contract." 9 The league
should not be penalized because the framers of this collective bar-
gaining agreement did not have the foresight to prohibit explicity
the contractual provision at issue here when they originally crafted
this ground-breaking collective bargaining agreement. As has been
stated at length, the league will suffer powerful negative repercus-
sions if the effectiveness of the salary cap is destroyed.160
The Dudley Problem Will Not Go Away
There is an argument that suggests the Dudley deal is all a big
to-do about nothing. This argument is premised on the fact that
the collective bargaining agreement is to expire at the end of the
present NBA season. Thus, it is contended, the existence of one-
year outs as a legitimate contractual tool will, in actuality, have
(d)(1) There may be no renegotiation, extension, or amendment of any kind, of
any Player Contract during the first year of the term of the Player Contract.
(2)(i) There may be no renegotiation, extension, or amendment of any kind, of
any Player Contract for a period of one year following any renegotiation, exten-
sion, or amendment concerning length of term of the Player contract or a change
in Salary of more than ten percent (10%) in any year of the Player Contract.
(3) In the case of a Player Contract with a stated term of one season or less,
there may be no renegotiation or extension of such contract until its term has
expired.
Id.
158. Id. at 184.
159. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. H, §§ 3-4.
160. See supra pp. 274-275, and notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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little impact on the league for two reasons. First, there are very few
unrestricted free agents who presently remain unsigned. Second,
these are the only individuals who possibly stand to be affected by
the provisions, because the NBA and the Players Association will
have to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement in which
they can simply add a clause explicitly prohibiting such termina-
tion provisions. Surely, the league will be able to induce the play-
ers to concede this point on a quid pro quo basis. 6'
This argument, however, fails to account for some very perti-
nent facts, the most important point being that until a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement is struck, the current collective bargain-
ing agreement will remain in place so long as the league continues
to apply without modification the player restrictions (e.g., the sal-
ary cap) that were included in the agreement, and so long as the
league reasonably believes that the practice or a close variant of it
will be incorporated in the next collective bargaining agreement, or
until an impasse is reached. 162 In the case of Bridgeman v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n,"' however, the district court defined "im-
passe" in such a manner that any party, claiming that antitrust
immunity is no longer available to an expired collective bargaining
agreement because of an impasse in negotiations, faces a very
heavy burden of proof.'6 In fact, the Bridgeman court, reflecting a
strong bias in favor of collective bargaining, concluded that, ide-
ally, the terms of a collective bargaining agreement should remain
in force until a new agreement is ironed out.16
161. See infra pp. 297-304 and 315-316 (suggesting some concessions the Players As-
sociation might seek from the League).
162. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987). The
Bridgeman case involved a suit by the players against the league claiming the college player
draft, the salary cap, and the right of first refusal constituted antitrust violations. The case
was unique in the respect that the collective bargaining agreement which had given birth to
the three provisions in question-the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding-had already
expired. The players did not dispute that the restrictions at issue were covered by the labor
exemption while the collective bargaining agreement was still in effect. The players, how-
ever, noting that courts have generally refused to find antitrust immunity in the absence of
a collective bargaining agreement, argued that the practices were not protected by the non-
statutory exemption because they are not the subject of any currently effective collective
bargaining agreement, and the players have not otherwise consented to them. The court
disagreed.
The Bridgeman case was eventually resolved when the parties to the litigation came to
a settlement agreement made and entered into on November 1, 1988. Id. This settlement
agreement was the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and the Players Asso-
ciation which expires at the end of the 1993-94 NBA season.
163. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 960.
164. Id. at 966-967.
165. Id. at 965-966. Specifically, District Court Judge Debevoise stated:
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Herein lies the problem. The current collective bargaining
agreement will expire at the end of the 1993-94 season. It is, how-
ever, not realistic that the parties will immediately enter into a
new agreement. Thus, pursuant to Bridgeman, unless the league
unilaterally imposes changes in the application of the cap re-
straints or the parties reach impasse, which will be almost impossi-
ble to prove, especially since the parties have not been engaged in
negotiations for a sizeable period of time, the requirements of the
present cap will continue to govern until a new settlement can be
agreed upon. As the cap agreement continues to govern, the "one-
year out" termination provisions-if the Third Circuit affirms the
findings of the district court-will be recognized as a legitimate
contractual tool pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
This would undeniably affect a vast player base, as the one-year
out provisions would apply when teams pursue those players be-
coming free agents at the close of the season, and when teams be-
gin negotiations with the next year's prize rookies.1 6  The ramifica-
tions to the league will surely prove to be very costly. 16 7 The
situation sense, thus, reveals that the Third Circuit would be serv-
I find no merit in the players' contention that restrictions included in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement should lose their antitrust immunity the moment the
agreement expires. At the outset such a rule is unrealistic in light of the require-
ment that employers must bargain fully and in good faith before altering a term
or condition of employment subject to mandatory bargaining even after the col-
lective bargaining agreement expires .... It would be anamolous for such re-
straints to enjoy antitrust immunity during the period of the previous agree-
ment, to lose that immunity automatically upon expiration of the agreement -
regardless of the status of negotiations for a new agreement - and then to
regain immunity upon entry of the new agreement.
Id. at 965. Judge Debevoise continued:
Stripping player restraints of their antitrust immunity the instant a collective
bargaining agreement expires would also inhibit the collective bargaining pro-
cess, a result that is contrary to the purpose of the non-statutory exemption.
Because agreements often expire without immediate replacement, employers op-
erating under such a rule would in many cases be reluctant to agree to poten-
tially anticompetitive restraints, even where desired by their employees, for fear
that such practices would expose them to antitrust suits during any period be-
tween agreements.
Id. at 965-966. Thus, Judge Debevoise concluded, "This obligation to maintain the status
quo until impasse means that, in a practical sense, terms and conditions of employment that
are subjects of mandatory bargaining survive expiration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id. at 965.
166. See supra note 132 (demonstrating the huge talent pool associated with free
agency).
167. Recognizing that such one-year out provisions defeat the purpose of the salary
cap, it is here asserted that the effects of allowing teams to be able to sign such a large
group of talented players, irrespective of cap considerations, will be analogous to completely
removing the salary cap. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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ing the best interests of all parties involved, including Chris Dud-
ley, 1 68 by invalidating the Dudley-Portland contract.
IRONING OUT A NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Thus far, this article has examined the legality of the cap and
the current legal crisis involving the legality of termination provi-
sions exemplified in the contract recently signed by Chris Dudley.
The remainder of this work will address what promises to be the
most intense areas of debate during negotiations regarding a new
collective bargaining agreement. Also included are some recom-
mendations which would most likely be beneficial to all parties
involved.
When the current collective bargaining agreement expires in
1994, the Players Association has made it known that they will
push for a discontinuance of the cap.16 9 It remains to be seen
whether this is just posturing to obtain a position of strength for
the actual negotiations, or if it is truly the legitimate position of
the Players Association."' For the remainder of this work, the
168. The main reason a player like Dudley stands to benefit from a provision such as
the one-year out in his contract is the prosperous economic atmosphere that has resulted
from the restraints of the cap. Allowing him to abuse the favorable position in which the cap
has placed him will only serve to undo all the good the cap has done for players like Dudley
in the future, and they will surely suffer accordingly.
169. Charles Grantham, the executive director of the Players Association, has stated
that "[w]hen we were approached with the idea in the early 1980s, it was very apparent the
league was having financial difficulties. Now, I think it has outlived it's [sic] usefulness."
William D. Murrary, NBA and its Players Reach Accord on Creative Accounting, UPI, Feb.
14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
170. This uncertainty involving the Players Association is in part due to a change in
leadership of the Players Association. Lawrence A. Fleischer, formerly the head man of the
Players Association and a most formidable advocate on behalf of the players, believed that a
cap, constructed properly, is good for the league. It seemed to have been his belief that
under the cap, the players, in actuality, stood a chance to make more than they would in the
absence of the cap. Needless to say, the league appreciated Mr. Fleischer's perspective. His
death was mourned by players and management alike.
Mr. Fleischer's replacement, Charles Grantham, does not appear to share his predeces-
sors appreciation for the cap. His posturing indicates that he believes the players would fare
better if there were no restrictions at all. Although this seems to be a valid argument, it fails
to consider the intricacies of the salary cap.
According to the views espoused by Mr. Grantham, a player will earn the greatest salary
when he is entitled to bargain for an unlimited income-an unlimited piece of the pie.
Under the cap an individual is restricted and entitled to only a certain portion of the pie.
What Mr. Fleischer seemed to appreciate and what Mr. Grantham does not, however, is that
under the cap, the pie grows infinitely larger. In the absence of the cap, simple supply and
demand will dictate wages. In a league that is popular and thriving, demand will be high
and salaries will rise accordingly. In a league that does poorly, salaries will fall accordingly.
History reveals that the league has struggled without the stabilizing influence of the cap.
See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. The truth of the matter is that the theoreti-
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more likely scenario will be assumed, that the Players Association
will pursue a continuance of the cap, although under terms more
favorable to their case.
Redefining Gross Revenue
Basically, the salary cap dictates that for any given year, the
players are entitled to, in the form of salaries, fifty-three percent of
the league's defined gross revenue less a certain amount of that
money which is set aside for player benefits. 171 What is of key im-
portance is the manner is which gross revenue is defined.172 As the
parties approach a new collective bargaining agreement, the Play-
ers Association has made clear its desire to restructure the agree-
ment so as to broaden the definition of "defined gross revenue."
cally unlimited wages available to players in the absence of a cap will, in fact, be limited by
the economics of a struggling league. Eventually, only the money barons of the league will
be able to offer the players the high wages they seek. Financially weaker teams will be
driven out of the league, unable to bid for the top talent. This is exactly the dismal situation
that prompted the creation of the cap. Need this situation repeat itself in order for everyone
involved to wise up? The bottom line is that the "limited piece of the pie" under the cap
will turn out to be much greater than the allegedly unlimited income available to players in
the cap's absence.
171. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. D, § 1(b); art. II (benefits).
172. Under the collective bargaining agreement "defined gross revenue" means:
$1,000,000 plus the aggregate revenues received or to be received on an accrual
basis, for or with respect to a playing season during the term of this agreement,
by the NBA and all NBA Teams . . . from all sources, whether known or un-
known, derived from, relating to or arising out of the performance of players in
NBA basketball games, but not including revenues derived from the All Star
Game, concessions, parking, sales of programs and novelties, NBA Properties,
Inc. and its subsidiaries, and sources included within "Other Basketball Income"
as previously defined by the parties for the purposes of the 1983 Memorandum
of Understanding to produce the annual Combined Financial Statement of NBA
Teams. Defined Gross Revenues shall include, without limitation:
(i) regular season gate receipts, net of admission taxes;
(ii) proceeds from the sale, license or other conveyance of the
right to broadcast or exhibit NBA preseason, regular season and
playoff games on radio and television including, without limitation,
network, local, cable and pay television, and all other means of dis-
tribution, net of reasonable or customary expenses related thereto;
(iii) exhibition game proceeds, net of admission taxes and all
reasonable or customary game, pre-season and training camp ex-
penses; and
(iv) playoff gate receipts, net of admission taxes, arena rentals
and all other reasonable or customary expenses except the player
playoff pool.
CBA, supra note 111, art. VII, pt. A, § 1(a).
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NBA Properties
Perhaps the most important provision in the collective bar-
gaining agreement regarding "defined gross revenue" is the clause
which states "defined gross revenue" does not include "revenues
derived from . .. NBA Properties, Inc. and its subsidiaries. 1 73
NBA Properties, Inc., a separate corporation owned by the teams,
is the licensing and marketing arm of the league. 174 NBA Proper-
ties, Inc. is a booming business which anticipates additional growth
and success in the foreseeable future. 17  Ball caps, trading cards,
and NBA team sportswear, which are growing ever more popular,
all fall under the wide-sweeping arm of NBA Properties, Inc. Note
also that the agreement excludes from the definition of "defined
gross revenue" the subsidiaries of NBA Properties, Inc., such as
NBA Entertainment and NBA International. 176 These two subsidi-
ary corporations are presently rich assets for the league, and the
potential earning power represented by these two corporations is of
particular interest, especially with the recent discovery of the pre-
viously untapped international market, which promises to bring
the league unprecedented amounts of income for years to come. 177
The earnings from these entities represent a tremendous amount
of money, none of which the players receive under the collective
bargaining agreement. The Players Association will attempt to en-
sure that at least a portion of the income brought in via NBA
Properties, Inc. and its subsidiaries is included within the defini-
tion of "defined gross revenue." Speculative financial figures reveal
that if this were the sole change made in the next collective bar-
gaining agreement, the 1994-95 salary cap would jump from
$15,175,000 to over $25,000,000.111
173. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. A, § 1(a)(1).
174. CBA, supra note 11, art. XXXII (Group Licensing Rights). Article XXXII pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Section 1. The Players Association, on behalf of present and future NBA play-
ers, agrees that NBA Properties, Inc. has the exclusive right to use the "Player's
Attributes" of each NBA player as such term is defined and for such purposes as
are set forth in the Agreement between NBA Properties, Inc. and the National
Basketball Players Association, dated July 19, 1986.
Id.
175. Dwight Chapin, They Love this Game, 1993 STREET AND SMITH'S PRO BASKETBA.L
6-8 (1993).
176. CBA, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. A, § 1(a)(1).
177. Chapin, supra note 175, at 7-8.
178. In the decade between 1982 and 1992, retail sales of NBA licensed merchandise
went from $10 million to $1.4 billion, and they're projected to reach $1.8 billion this season.
Id. at 6.
179. This figure is obtained through the application of the following data:
[Vol. 11:251
48
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss2/3
NBA SALARY CAP
Who is properly entitled to this money? At least a portion of it
should go to the league's players. From one perspective, it seems
ridiculous that a group of men, who currently earn, on average,
more than $1,000,000 a year for playing the game of basketball,
somehow deserve more money.180 The question, however, is not
whether it makes sense for the players to make more money, but
rather, in light of the fact that the money is there, who should get
it. NBA Properties, Inc.'s massive earning power derives from the
fact that pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, it has
the exclusive right to use the "Player's Attributes" of NBA play-
ers. 81 NBA Properties, Inc. is a thriving business because the play-
ers are a hot commodity to sell. Granted, the players are a hot
commodity because the league has proven to be a master marketer,
but regardless of the degree of marketing excellence, NBA Proper-
ties, Inc. would not be a successful entity were it not for the play-
ers. Thus, it only seems proper that this income should be shared
between the league and its players like the remainder of the in-
Cap for the current season - $15,175,000
Projected Cap for the 1994-95 season under the current definition of "defined gross
revenue" - $16,692,500
This projected figure represents a ten percent increase over the previous year's salary
cap, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement's provision for projecting team
salary caps. CBA, supra note 11, Article VII, Part D, Section 1. Note, however, the cap has
increased at an average of not 10% from one season to the next, but rather at an average of
18%. See supra note 12. The remainder of this calculation will be based upon this eighteen
percent figure:
Actual Projected Cap for the 1994-95 season under current definition of "defined gross
revenue" - $17,906,500
It is rumored that for 1993-94 NBA season the league has projected that NBA Proper-
ties, Inc. and its subsidiaries will earn roughly $400,000,000. Assuming this figure is intro-
duced into "defined gross revenue," the salary cap for the 1994-95 NBA season stands to be
$10,000,000 higher than it was for the 1993-94 season:
53% of $400,000,000 = $212,000,000 which divided by 27 [the number of teams
in the league] equals $7,851,851. Thus, if the revenues brought in by NBA
Properties, Inc. and its subsidiaries were added to the definition of "defined
gross revenue" each team would gain an additional $7,851,851 under the cap,
thereby increasing the cap from $15,175,000 in 1993-94 to $25,758,351 in 1994-95
1993-94 Salary Cap $15,175,000
Projected Cap for 1994-95 $17,906,500
Additional Revenues from NBA Properties $ 7,851,851
Cap for 1994-95 with expanded
definition of "defined gross revenue" $25,758,351
180. This perspective, however, is not necessarily the proper one. After all, other en-
tertainment stars are also tremendously overpaid. No one criticizes Oprah Winfrey for tak-
ing home more than $50 million a year while the typical high school teacher makes roughly
$25,000. Server, supra note 1, at 91.
181. See supra note 174.
1994]
49
Rothstein: The Salary Cap: A Legal Analysis of and Practical Suggestions for
Published by Institutional Repository, 1994
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
come incorporated within the definition of "defined gross reve-
nue." It is violative of inherent justice that under the current sys-
tem, the league's owners are the only ones profiting from the
league's ability to market the "Player's Attributes."
Furthermore, it is a ridiculous notion to suggest that the
league is properly entitled to this money based upon the principle
of estoppel, as the Players Association bargained away the rights to
this income when the original cap agreement was struck in 1983.181
When the Players Association bargained away its rights to this
money back in 1983, it was not a major concession, as there was
relatively little money involved. 18 This is no longer the situa-
tion.18 4 In negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement, the
NBA and the Players Association should be governed by the facts
as they presently exist, not by the facts of a decade past. The pres-
ence of this income is a new factor to the situation, and it should
be dealt with equitably. Equity demands that the players receive a
share of this money.
This issue, however, cannot be so easily resolved. There exists
a problem in that the Players Association has negotiated away the
rights to this income (for at least some of its players) beyond the
expiration of the current collective bargaining agreement-until
1997.185 Thus, it appears that as a result of contractual negotia-
tions, the league is entitled to the money brought in via NBA
Properties, Inc. through the 1997 season, and accordingly, the
league is under no legal obligation to forfeit this right during the
negotiations of the next collective bargaining agreement. Hence, as
a matter of law, the players will have to concede the rights to this
income through at least 1997 under the terms of the next collective
bargaining agreement.
182. The 1983 Memorandum of Understanding also contains a provision stating that
defined gross revenue is not to include " . . . revenues derived from the All Star Game,
concessions, parking, sales of programs and novelties, NBA Properties, Inc .... " Memoran-
dum of Understanding, supra note 6, at 2-3. This provision was then adopted by the current
collective bargaining agreement.
183. As of 1982, the retail sales of NBA licensed merchandise was only $10 million.
Chapin, supra note 175, at 6.
184. See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
185. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 11, Exhibit A, 18(b) (Uniform
Player Contract). 18(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) the Player hereby grants to NBA Properties, Inc., for the term of this con-
tract only, but in no event longer than August 31, 1997, the exclusive rights to
use the Player's Attributes as such term is defined and for such purposes as are
set forth in the Agreement between NBA Properties, Inc. and the National Bas-
ketball Association, dated July 19, 1986 ....
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Recall, however, that in validating the collective bargaining
agreement under the Mackey Test, which appears to be the con-
trolling test, a major reason why the agreement was upheld is be-
cause it was found to be the "result of bona fide arms-length nego-
tiations." '186 Query whether a concession dating back to 1983, which
is binding upon the same parties who will engage in the renegoti-
ation of the collective bargaining agreement, would be deemed to
be the "result of bona fide arms-length negotiations" in light of the
very different factual setting of today. Put differently, should the
league refuse to renegotiate the rights to the revenue associated
with NBA Properties, Inc. at the next collective bargaining session
where there is reason to believe that any agreement struck might
not survive antitrust scrutiny?
Analyzing equitable considerations, along with the relevant
law, it seems proper and wise for the revenues of NBA Properties,
Inc. and its subsidiaries to be included within the definition of "de-
fined gross revenue" when the NBA and the Players Association
form the next collective bargaining agreement. Practical considera-
tions regarding the applicability of the salary cap also dictate that
the definition of "defined gross revenue" should be expanded to
include these revenues. Since the institution of the salary cap, the
league and the players have both experienced tremendous financial
success. The major negative effect associated with the salary cap is
the way in which it has limited player mobility. The cap, however,
only serves as a serious impediment to player mobility for teams
that are at or over the cap.1 87 When the cap was first adopted in
1984-85, almost all the league's teams were at or near the salary
cap. 88 Furthermore, as the agreement was unique in professional
sports, many teams did not have the foresight to effectively apply
the cap to plan for the future. The combination of these two fac-
tors created a situation where teams have traditionally been hover-
ing near the salary cap ceiling, and thus the cap has, in fact, served
as a considerable restraint upon player mobility. If, however, the
money from NBA Properties, Inc. and its subsidiaries were to be
included within "defined gross revenue," it would pump the cap up
to create somewhat of a comfort zone between existing team pay-
186. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. at 528. See also supra note 38
and accompanying text.
187. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 11, art. VII, pts. E-F.
188. In fact, five of the league's teams were already over the cap. Those teams, the
Lakers, Nets, Knicks, 76ers, and the Seattle Supersonics, had their team payrolls
grandfathered in, but had to be in line with cap mandates by the beginning of the 1988-89
playing season. Levine, supra note 2, at 87 n.97.
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rolls and the roof of the salary cap.15 This comfort zone would be
of particular significance because now, after almost a decade of
fighting with the cap, teams are familiar with the cap's intricacies
and should be able to apply it with the necessary foresight to plan
for the future and stay under the roof as dictated by the cap. Thus,
the league would be able to enjoy the financial success precipitated
by the cap while avoiding the restrictions imposed upon player mo-
bility when teams exceed the cap.
Sky Boxes
Another area that promises to be the focus of much attention
involves the revenue generated from the sale of luxury boxes.
Under the current collective bargaining agreement, the definition
of "defined gross revenue" expressly includes proceeds generated
from gate receipts for exhibition, regular season and playoff
games.190 The agreement, however, expressly provides for the ex-
clusion of "Other Basketball Income" from "defined gross reve-
nue."19 "Other Basketball Income" is defined in the agreement to
include sources of revenue reported by the teams as "Other Bas-
ketball Income" in the combined financial statement of NBA
teams prepared before the institution of the salary cap in 1983.192
It appears that prior to the institution of the cap in 1983, NBA
teams reported the revenue generated by the sale of luxury boxes
as "Other Basketball Income." Thus, the revenue generated from
the sale of luxury boxes is money the players are not entitled to
under the collective bargaining agreement. Under the next agree-
189. The cap for the 1994-95 season could be well over $25 million if the income from
NBA Properties, Inc. and its subsidiaries were to be included in the definition of "defined
gross revenue." See supra note 179. If the cap for the 1994-95 season were to exceed $25
million, most, if not all, of the league's teams would be substantially beneath the cap. In
fact, for the 1993-94 NBA season, there were only three teams in the league whose payrolls
exceeded $22 million, none of which exceeded $24.8 million, and the 1993-94 average team
salary was roughly $18.2 million. Player Contracts, supra note 70.
190. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 11, art. VII, pt. A, § 1(a)(1)(i-iv).
191. Id. at art. VII, pt. A, § 1(a)(1).
192. Id. The NBA does riot report directly to the Players Association the amount of its
revenues included in "defined gross revenue." Rather, the parties have by agreement ap-
pointed an independent accounting firm to review the revenues reported by the NBA and
its member teams and then to report to the Players and the NBA regarding "defined gross
revenue" and other pertinent information. Arthur Anderson & Co. (AA) has performed this
function since the 1983 inception of the salary cap system. Each year the NBA and its teams
complete "defined gross revenue" reporting packages prepared by AA, and forward them
directly to AA. AA then conducts certain review procedures agreed to by the NBA and the
Players Association. Letter from Jeffrey A. Mishkin, Legal Counsel on behalf of the Players
Association, to Merrell E. Clark, Special Master 5 (Dec. 19, 1991) (on file with author).
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ment, the players will want to see some of this money. Similar to
the revenue generated by NBA Properties, Inc. and its subsidiar-
ies, when the Players Association negotiated away the rights to the
income generated from the sale of luxury boxes there was little at
stake, whereas there is now a great deal of money involved.
Note that the boxes in question are now commonly referred to
as "luxury boxes." This name has significant meaning. At one time,
these boxes were commonly referred to as "sky boxes," appropri-
ately named because they hovered far above the playing court, just
below arena ceilings. Now, however, not all of the boxes are up in
the sky. Prior to the 1988-89 NBA season, the Detroit Pistons
moved from the Pontiac Silverdome down the street into an arena
the Pistons built themselves: the Palace of Auburn Hills.1e3 The
Palace is a state-of-the-art, 21,000-seat arena. One particularly in-
teresting aspect of the Palace is that the sky boxes are not all in
the sky. In fact, many of the "luxury boxes" are located roughly
half-way up the lower level. Aesthetically, the boxes are most
impressive.""'
The Pistons, prior to the opening of the 1988-89 NBA season,
hoped to charge what was then considered an unreasonable
amount of money for these boxes. The boxes, however, wound up
selling for everything the Pistons had hoped, and they became a
tremendous source of revenue.9 '
Trying to emulate the Pistons' ingenuity and financial success,
many teams who have since built new stadiums have constructed
them with luxury boxes in the lower level.196 With the presence of
this "new source119 7 of revenue, the Players Association now
193. The Pontiac Silverdome is a massive domed arena, much better suited for foot-
ball than basketball. It is home to the Detroit Lions football team. In order to play basket-
ball there, a quarter of the arena was portioned off by hanging huge drapes from the roof of
the dome. The Pistons moved because the City of Pontiac would not allow the Pistons to
have a share of almost any of the income the Pistons were generating for the arena, such as
parking, food, and beverages. Thus, the Pistons moved less than two miles down the road
into the Palace of Auburn Hills. This information is from personal knowledge obtained
while the author's father was an employee with the Piston organization (assistant coach
1986-87, 1987-88; broadcaster 1991-92; head coach 1992-93).
194. The interior of the boxes resembles a four-star hotel and the wall closest to the
playing court is open and gives way to a couple of rows of seats in the general Palace
audience.
195. The Pistons organization was unwilling to disclose how much revenue they earn
via their luxury boxes.
196. For example, Cleveland and Chicago have recently built new arenas with luxury
boxes in the lower level. Similarly, Philadelphia, Boston, and Portland all have plans to
build arenas in the near future which will include luxury boxes in the lower level. This is
based upon personal knowledge and information obtained via confidential sources.
197. Recall that when the Players Association bargained away the right to revenue
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desires a piece of the action. This is another area where the owners
should concede to the desires of the Players Association. The lux-
ury boxes are successful for two reasons: (1) the players and the
game itself are a top attraction for which people are willing to pay
top dollar; and (2) management has built arenas where the boxes
are closer to the playing action and hence markedly more desira-
ble. Fairness dictates that the players should be entitled to at least
a portion of this income.
THE GIVE AND TAKE OF IT ALL
Thus far, two topics have been addressed which both promise
to be the focus of much attention as the league and the Players
Association try to work out a new agreement. In both instances, it
has been suggested that the league give in to the demands of the
Players Association. These requests, however, have not been un-
reasonable, for in any bargaining process both sides must be pre-
pared to give something in order to get something. The next sec-
tion of this work will address an area where the Players
Association is the party that should give a little.
A Rookie Salary Cap
There has been talk that the league will try to initiate a rookie
salary cap to supplement the league-wide salary cap.'98 Such a pro-
vision would certainly be well-received by NBA team owners, as
the annual inflation of rookie salaries seems to be the primary
force behind the continual upward surge of player wages through-
out the league. 199 Unfortunately, it appears that this is little more
associated with luxury boxes back in 1983, it was a minor concession. That is no longer the
case.
198. This information is based upon informal conversations with players, coaches,
player agents and general managers, all of whom have asked to remain anonymous.
199. Prior to last season (1992-93), Shaquille O'Neal signed a contract which in the
aggregate is reportedly worth slightly more than $40 million. At the time it was one of the
larger contracts the league had ever seen. Yet two of this year's top three picks, Chris Web-
ber and Anfernee Hardaway, have already signed contracts worth $74.4 million and $65
million, respectively. First Round Signings, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1993, at 11H.
This inflation has effects that transcend more than just the amount of money the league
pays its rookies. Veteran free agents are aware of what the league's new talent is being paid,
and this has a substantial effect on what these veterans demand. For example, Derrick Cole-
man of the New Jersey Nets was reportedly seeking a contract worth $70 million over 10
years. After the signings of Webber, Hardaway, and Larry Johnson, who struck a new deal
with the Charlotte Hornets worth $84 million over 12 years, the Nets offered Coleman a
contract worth $69 million over eight years, which would have made him the highest paid
player in the NBA. S.L. Price, $69 million? Chump Change in Two Years, MLAMI HERALD,
Nov. 4, 1993, at 11H. Coleman, who rejected the offer, indicated his position was directly
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than talk, as the Players Association has expressed extreme ani-
mosity towards such a proposition. 00 Such a provision, though,
would be most beneficial to the continued success of the league.
This is one instance where it is the Players Association that should
give in and allow for the institution of a rookie salary cap, as it
would ultimately prove to be in the players' best interest.
There are two elements associated with a rookie cap that make
it an attractive proposition. First, it will introduce into the league's
player status hierarchy the beneficial aspects of a "quasi" seniority
system. Second, it will ensure that the limited amount of money
the players are entitled to under the cap will be distributed accord-
ing to merit.
A basketball team cannot be at its best when the team locker
room is one where friction dominates over camaraderie. Likewise,
it will tend to adversely affect the games being played if the games
are between teams which are dealing with internal friction as well
as one another. Simply put, the quality of the final product, NBA
games, is best when the two teams involved are focused primarily
on winning the game, and off-court distractions are kept to a mini-
mum. The media makes it plainly obvious that NBA teams are not
always cohesive units. A rookie salary cap will in no way eliminate
all the problems that can arise in an NBA locker room that might
adversely effect the quality of play, but it will help significantly.
One of the major differences between a college and profes-
sional locker room is that in college basketball, there is a well-
respected seniority system. In most programs, the seniors impart
to the freshmen the traditions of their particular program, and, in
the traditional program, the seniors serve as the leaders on the
team. 01 For the most part, this hierarchical system, based upon
seniority, is well-respected at the collegiate level, and tends to pro-
duce cohesive units where senior players lay down the rules, and
influenced by the recent signings of the top rookies:
Wasn't always like this. Too bad. I mean, four rookies come in, haven't done a
thing, and rack up cake like you've never seen. Chris Webber: $74.4 mill. Shawn
Bradley: $44.2 mill. Anfernee Hardaway: $65 mill. Jamal Mashburn: $32 mill.
After he signs, Webber-Mr. TimeOUT!-says he would've gladly played for
free. Uh-huh .. . $69 million for me? You don't understand. I am the game.
Id. (emphasis in original).
200. The players have taken the stance that if the league wants to cap the rookies,
then the league-wide cap must be removed. The league will not make such a concession.
Information obtained via confidential sources.
201. This assertion is based upon conversations with college and professional players
as well as the author's personal experience as a Division I college basketball player at Holy
Cross College, where, as a senior, the author was team captain.
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the younger players respectfully follow them. This prompts a great
deal of integrity within the college game. One could contend this is
one reason why the college game is so popular.
There is a similar seniority system in the NBA. Veteran play-
ers are traditionally the ones most respected by their peers and
treated with the most respect by officials. Team captains are al-
most always veterans, while rookies assist the equipment manager
in carrying luggage on road trips. The system in the NBA, how-
ever, is distinguishable in one major regard. Rookies, particularly
those who were lottery picks, are often among the highest paid on
a given NBA roster.202 This has far-reaching ramifications within
NBA locker rooms. The seniority system, inherent in team sports,
loses some of its effectiveness when the alleged low man on the
totem pole is the most handsomely compensated. One reason is
that young players have less of a tendency to respect their elder
teammates when their wages indicate to the young player that he
is the player most valuable to the team. In turn, veteran players
tend to grow envious. The logic of the veteran player is both un-
derstandable and undeniable: "I have been a good player for this
team and they reward me by going out and signing this kid who
has not played a day in this league for three times what they pay
me. ' '203 These off the court unpleasantries inevitably affect on-the-
court performances, and the end product tends to suffer.
The jealousy emanating from veterans towards top draft picks,
and the negative influence such emotions have upon the on-court
product, grow considerably in degree when it becomes evident that
the high salary awarded to a rookie is not merited. The history of
the NBA is heavily tattooed with top draft picks who have not
panned out.2 0 4 Needless to say, these players all signed substantial
202. For example, Christian Laettner, number three pick overall in his rookie year,
was the highest paid player on the Minnesota Timberwolves as a rookie. Shaquille O'Neal
was the highest paid member of the Magic during his rookie season. For the 1993-94 season,
then-rookie center Shawn Bradley of the Philadelphia 76ers was their highest paid player.
Player Contracts, supra note 70.
203. See supra note 199.
204. In recent years all of the following players were high first-round draft picks, yet,
in the author's opinion, they have all either performed at a level far below their advance
billing or simply failed to make it as an NBA caliber player:
Name Team Year Pick
Doug Smith Dallas 1991 6th pick
Luc Longley Minnesota 1991 7th pick
Mark Macon Denver 1991 8th pick
Greg Anthony New York 1991 12th pick
Rich King Seattle 1991 14th pick
Dennis Scott Orlando 1990 4th pick
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contracts upon their entrance into the league. It also goes without
saying that these players were probably not well-received by their
teammates when it became evident their pay was unwarranted. In-
Felton Spencer
Bo Kimble
Willie Burton
Rumeal Robinson
Alec Kessler
Travis Mays
Pervis Ellison
Danny Ferry
JR Reid
Stacey King
George McCloud
Randy White
Tom Hammonds
Tim Perry
Rex Chapman
Armon Gilliam
Dennis Hopson
Reggie Williams
Olden Polynice
Chris Washburn
Kenny Walker
William Bedford
Brad Sellers
Pearl Washington
Walter Berry
Wayman Tisdale
Benoit Benjamin
Jon Koncack
Joe Kleine
Ed Pickney
Keith Lee
Kenny Green
Melvin Turpin
Lancaster Gordin
Leon Wood
Steve Stipanovich
Sidney Green
Russel Cross
Bill Garnet
Keith Edmonson
Al Wood
Danny Vranes
Joe Barry Carroll
Kelvin Ransey
James Ray
David Greenwood
Greg Kelser
Kent Benson
LaRue Martin
Minnesota
L.A. Clippers
Miami
Atlanta
Miami
Sacramento
Sacramento
Cleveland
Charlotte
Chicago
Indiana
Dallas
Washington
Phoenix
Charlotte
Phoenix
New Jersey
L.A. Clippers
Chicago
Golden State
New York
Phoenix
Chicago
New Jersey
Portland
Indiana
L.A. Clippers
Atlanta
Sacramento
Phoenix
Chicago
Washington
Washington
L.A. Clippers
Philadelphia
Indiana
Chicago
Golden State
Dallas
Atlanta
Atlanta
Atlanta
Golden State
Chicago
Denver
Chicago
Detroit
Milwaukee
Portland
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1988
1988
1987
1987
1987
1987
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1984
1984
1984
1983
1983
1983
1982
1982
1981
1981
1980
1980
1980
1979
1979
1977
1972
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick
pick.
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deed, it must be difficult for a player to walk into his locker room
and sit next to a man who is inferior as a player yet earns consider-
ably more money.20 5 It is not a stretch to suggest that these unmer-
ited rookie wages serve as a most significant factor in increasing
player salaries league wide. Often, when a veteran free agent be-
gins renegotiation talks with his team, it is a major bargaining tool
to point out other players who have entered the league since the
player in question signed his contract, who play a similar position,
signed for significantly more money, and have produced far less.20 6
The institution of a rookie cap would help to remedy some of
these difficulties. The Players Association feels that such a provi-
sion will only serve to slow the rising player wages throughout the
league. This will not occur. Wages will continue to rise, but a
rookie cap will ensure that the money will be distributed to players
who have proven their value in the league. For an example of how
this proposition might work, focus on the 1989 NBA draft. The
1989 draft involved a number of players who were predicted to be
impact players upon their entrance into the league but who turned
205. Imagine being a fourth-year associate at a major law firm, and the firm offers
more money to a first-year associate you always have to cover up for on account of his inept
lawyering skills.
206. See, e.g., supra note 199. Another classic example where an unmerited rookie
contract prompted difficulty recently affected the Miami Heat.
Despite having a very accomplished career at Eastern Michigan University, Grant Long
was overlooked by most NBA talent scouts and was not selected until Miami plucked him in
the middle of the second round with the 33rd pick overall of the 1988 NBA draft. In light of
his draft status, Long reportedly signed a contract worth considerably less than the average
NBA player was making. Long, however, surprised everyone and has become a very effective
professional player, averaging 12 points per game as a rookie. His scoring average, however,
does not reflect the true value of Long, who is the type of player whose total worth does not
always show up in the box score.
Two years later, the Heat had the rights to the 12th pick in the draft, which they used
to select Alec Kessler of the University of Georgia. At 6'11" and 240 pounds with the ability
to step back and shoot the perimeter jump shot, Kessler was widely regarded as a wise pick,
a player certain to become a good professional. Kessler was awarded a contract that re-
flected the high expectations the Heat had for him. Kessler, however, turned out to be a
flop. In the first three years of his NBA career, he failed to average more than six points per
game in a single season. During the 1992-93 season, Kessler averaged a career low 3.9 points
per game.
Prior to the 1992-93 NBA season, the Heat had both Kessler and Long in the power
forward slot on the depth chart. Kessler earned far more money, while Long was far supe-
rior on the court. The paradox caused problems. Long reportedly grew disheartened with
management and was seeking to be traded. The controversy was well documented in the
media. From sources close to the team, all the negative publicity associated with the contro-
versy had a negative effect upon the entire team. Eventually, however, the situation was
alleviated when after considerable stalemates in contract negotiations and trade rumors, the
Heat offered Long a contract which more accurately reflected his valuable contributions.
Information obtained via confidential sources.
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out to be marginal players at best. In contrast, the draft included a
number of players from whom the talent scouts expected far less,
who, nonetheless, have turned out to be very good professional
players, and in some instances, excellent. 0 7 Thus, pursuant to the
traditional manner in which draft picks are signed, the 1989 draft
produced some players very undeserving of their lofty contracts,
and some bright young talents who were vastly underpaid. 08
Suppose there were a rookie cap in place where all the draft
picks were slotted to a predetermined salary for a predetermined
number of years, with salaries rising by a set amount each year.
Further, suppose that after the number of years for which the par-
ties decide to cap rookie salaries expires, all of those players be-
come restricted free agents.2 09 Pay would, at long last, be distrib-
207. Among the first nine picks of the 1989 NBA draft were . . .
Danny Ferry 2nd
J.R. Reid 5th
Stacey King 6th
George McCloud 7th
Randy White 8th
Tom Hammonds 9th
... all of whom have failed to live up to their advance billing. The 1989 draft did, however,
produce the following sleepers between picks #10-26..
Pooh Richardson 10th
Nick Anderson 11th
Tim Hardaway 13th
Shawn Kemp 17th
Blue Edwards 21st
Vlade Divac 26th
THE SPORTING Nzws, NBA REGISTER (1993).
208. For example, Shawn Kemp, the Supersonics' budding young superstar, reportedly
was to earn roughly $700,000 for 1992-93, a season in which he was an All-Star. Obtained via
confidential sources. Recall the average NBA salary was over one million dollars. See supra
note 12.
209. For example, a suggested rookie cap would slot rookie salaries for two years. Any
number of years could be chosen, but two years seems to be a reasonable period of time in
which to determine how good a given professional will become without locking the players
into wages dictated by their draft position for too long. For any given year, the league and
the Players Association would decide upon a salary to be paid to the number one pick.
Ideally, it is a salary that is below what the marquee players in the league earn but still
enough to indicate that a player was the number one player chosen. The remaining picks in
the draft are then slotted in at a certain amount less than the pick immediately preceding.
Then, in Year Two, each player's salary is increased by ten percent. For the following sea-
son, the player picked at each number will earn what the player picked the year prior at the
same position earned in Year Two. The process would then repeat itself. At the end of the
two years all the draft picks then become restricted free agents as pay is reallocated accord-
ing to merit.
To illustrate, suppose that such a rookie cap was instituted for the 1990 NBA draft, and
the league and the players determined that the numer one pick should be awarded $2 mil-
lion. Salaries would then be as follows for a player's first two years in the league through the
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uted according to merit. After the rookie cap period expired, a
player's salary will increase or decrease according to his perceived
market value. Making the formerly capped rookies restricted free
agents will allow their salaries to reflect their market worth, while
it will still provide for the reliance interests of the teams who se-
lected them. °10 It would be foolish to contend that player salaries
would cease to rise as rapidly as they have been over the past sev-
eral years.211 They would continue to rise, but unlike the current
system, there would be a more direct correlation between salary
and player performance.21 2
1993-94 NBA season:
year of draft draft pick wages in year 1 wages in year 2
90 1 $2,000,000 $2,200,000
90 2 $1,900,000 $2,090,000
90 3 $1,800,000 $1,980,000
90 4 $1,700,000 $1,870,000
90 5 $1,600,000 $1,760,000
91 1 $2,200,000 $2,420,000
91 2 $2,090,000 $2,299,000
91 3 $1,980,000 $2,178,000
91 4 $1,870,000 $2,057,000
91 5 $1,760,000 $1,936,000
92 1 $2,420,000 $2,662,000
92 2 $2,299,000 $2,528,900
92 3 $2,178,000 $2,395,800
92 4 $2,057,000 $2,262,700
92 5 $1,936,000 $2,129,600
93 1 $2,662,000 $2,928,200
93 2 $2,528,900 $2,781,790
93 3 $2,395,800 $2,635,380
93 4 $2,262,700 $2,488,970
93 5 $2,129,600 $2,342,600.
Teams would be allowed to sign rookie free agents at any price, but only for a period of
two years at which point they, too, would be re-evaluated according to merit.
In regard to Team Salary Cap limits, a team would only have to clear enough money
under the cap to sign a player for what his slotted salary dictates.
If at any point it appears that the escalation of rookie salaries is not keeping pace with
the financial success of the league, then the league and the Players Association could rene-
gotiate the starting salary for the number one pick for the following year, as well as the
percentage by which the salaries are to increase.
210. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
211. For example, imagine what Shaquille O'Neal or Alonzo Mourning would sign for
at the close of the 1993-94 season (their second in the league) if they were to become re-
stricted free agents.
212. Still, situations might occur where a bidding war for a restricted free agent might
drive his salary beyond his actual worth if his former team is not willing to let him go. The
player in question, however, in such a situation would have already established exactly what
he was and was not capable of. If a team decided they were going to outbid another team for
him, they would, in advance, be aware of the fact that they were going to overpay him. The
guessing game involved with paying unproven rookies top money would come to a close.
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This would be a welcome change to the game of professional
basketball. Needless to say, team owners would appreciate not
having to pay marginal players the type of money due an All-
Star.213 NBA fans would also be certain to approve of a rookie cap.
Attendance at any NBA game will reveal that the crowd tends to
grow upset with players who earn a hefty paycheck but do not pro-
duce accordingly.2"4 In addition, the institution of a rookie cap
would go a long way in clearing up some of the bad vibes which
currently exist in NBA locker rooms. Such a provision may even be
welcome by some NBA players. Within team locker rooms, some of
the emphasis would be shifted away from the ridiculous individual
attitudes, e.g., "this damn rookie is making more than I am and I
am twice the player he will ever be," towards a team attitude
whose primary focus is winning games. Placing more emphasis on
winning games and removing the negative vibes associated with
unwarranted salaries will improve the ultimate product: NBA
games. The average basketball fan will be able to appreciate this.
The laws of economics dictate that all things being equal, demand
will rise with the quality of the product. Thus, the institution of a
rookie cap, via the introduction of merited salaries, a touch of in-
tegrity, and the removal of all the negatives associated with un-
merited wages will prompt the league to grow ever more popular.
Under the revenue sharing plan of the salary cap, a more popular
league means more money for the players. It would appear that
even the players stand to benefit, on an aggregate level, from the
institution of a rookie cap. All things considered, it seems like this
would be a beneficial provision for all parties involved.
The introduction of a rookie cap does, however, raise equitable
concerns in the unfortunate event that a young player suffers a
career-ending injury. Under the current system, a rookie entering
the league has the opportunity to contract for many years, thereby
protecting himself against the possibility of a career-ending in-
jury."'b Once a rookie signs a contract, he is assured of his money
for the life of his contract, even if he wrecks a knee in training
213. The Cleveland Cavaliers, for example, cannot be pleased about the fact that for
the 1993-94 NBA season, they are obligated to pay Danny Ferry $3,542,857. Player Con-
tracts, supra note 70. Even worse, Ferry has two years left on his contract at similar dollar
figures.
214. For example, the crowd in the Omni, home to the Atlanta Hawks, continually
displays their displeasure with Jon Koncack. A bidding war several years ago made Kon-
cack, a marginal NBA center, a very highly-paid player. Koncack has thus earned the infa-
mous nickname of Jon "Contract."
215. A vast majority of NBA contracts are guaranteed. Player Contracts, supra note
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camp and, as a result, cannot ever play a single minute in the
league. Under a rookie cap similar to the one recommended here,2 16
a player no longer has the opportunity to ensure his financial se-
curity by signing a long-term contract immediately upon his en-
trance into the league.
From the perspective of the average fan, this must seem un-
fair. From the perspective of a potential first-round draft pick, it
surely seems draconian. The inequity of the situation, however, can
easily be alleviated by the institution of an insurance program
which would award protection to each and every rookie player
upon the signing of their initial contracts.217 This would protect
216. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
217. Referring to the proposed rookie salary cap in note 209, an accompanying insur-
ance policy plan might work as follows:
1. The league and the Players Association agree on the number of years a player is to be
covered. In determining this figure, the parties should consider the player is to be compen-
sated for his pain and suffering, and that the player, in the form of collective bargaining, has
previously given up his right to sign a long-term contract as a rookie. For example, ten years
would serve as a good figure as it would represent a period longer than the average playing
career.
2. The amount awarded under the policy, in the event the player does suffer a career ending
injury within his first two years, is to be directly correlated to the position in which he was
drafted. The amount should also consider that wages would most likely continue to rise, on
a league wide basis, throughout what would have been the playing career of the player had
he not been hurt. For example, the player's salary would continue to rise at a rate of 10%
per year, beginning with what the player was to make in Year Two of his rookie contract.
This would then continue for 10 years beyond the expiration of his rookie contract.
Thus, referring to the rookie plan in note 209, supra, suppose the first pick of the 1990
draft and the fifth pick of the 1991 draft were both to suffer career ending-injuries in their
rookie season, both players would receive the amount remaining under their rookie contract.
Thus, the number one pick of the 1990 draft would receive $2 million in Year One and $2.2
million in Year Two. The number five pick of the 1991 draft would receive $1,760,000 in
Year One and $1,936,000 in Year Two. At this point-the beginning of what would have
been their third year in the league-the players would begin to receive payments arising
from their respective insurance policies, which as stated earlier, will continue to rise at a
rate of ten percent per year. Thus, in Year Three the number one pick of the 1990 draft
would earn $2,420,000 and the number five pick of the 1991 draft would earn $2,129,600.
These payments would continue for the next 10 years. The exact payments would be as
follows:
Source of Payment Recipient and Dollar designation
#1 pick of '90 draft #5 pick of '91 draft
Year #1 of
Rookie Contract $2,000,000 $1,760,000
Year #2 of
Rookie Contract $2,200,000 $1,936,000
Insurance Payments
Year #1 $2,420,000 $2,129,600
Year #2 $2,662,000 $2,342,600
Year #3 $2,928,200 $2,576,860
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the financial interests of the rookie who suffers the unfortunate
fate of having his career ended prematurely, yet it would allow the
league to enjoy all the benefits of a rookie cap. Team owners would
not be adverse to the introduction of such a provision because it
presents a lesser financial burden, and less of a headache, than
having to pay a player an undeserved salary.2 18
The Legality of a Rookie Cap
A cursory glance would seem to indicate that a rookie salary
cap, although a good idea, remains an impossibility, because it
would violate antitrust law. A more thorough analysis, however,
shows that according to pertinent case law, a rookie cap would not
be violative of antitrust law. 19 Indeed, the district court in
Wood 2 stated that "[alt the time an agreement is signed between
the owners and the players' exclusive bargaining representative, all
players within the bargaining unit and those who enter the bar-
gaining unit during the life of the agreement are bound by its
Year #4 $3,221,020 $2,834,546
Year #5 $3,543,122 $3,118,000
Year #6 $3,897,434 $3,429,800
Year #7 $4,287,177 $3,772,780
Year #8 $4,715,894 $4,150,058
Year #9 $5,187,483 $4,565,063
Year #10 $5,706,231 $5,021,569
12 year totals $42,768,561 $37,636,876
218. This is because the money that would be used to pay off such an insurance policy
would come from the league's 27 member teams collectively. Under the current system, indi-
vidual owners have to bear the financial brunt of what proves to be an unwise draft selec-
tion. Recall in note 217, supra, that the value of the insurance policy that would have to be
paid to the number one pick of the 1990 draft was $38,568,561:
$42,768,561 12-year total
- $ 4,200,000 his collective salary from his
rookie contract
$38,568,561 total value of insurance policy
This figure divided by the league's 27 member teams amounts to $1,428,465 per team to
be paid out over the course of 10 years. Thus, a career-ending injury to the number one pick
of the 1990 draft would cost every team in the league $142,846 per season (which would not
count against them under the cap). In contrast, the Cavaliers of Cleveland are obligated to
pay Danny Ferry over $3.5 million for the 1993-94 season alone.
219. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944) (holding that when an em-
ployee is hired after the collective bargaining agreement has been made, "the terms of [his]
employment already have been traded out"); NLRB v. Laney and Duke Storage Warehouse
Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966) ("The duty to bargain is a continuous one, and a
union may legitimately bargain over wages and conditions of employment which will affect
employees who are to be hired in the future.").
220. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525 (1984).
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terms."2"1 Emphasizing this point, the district judge in Wood, re-
ferring to the salary cap, announced, "It is binding on plaintiff and
all others now in the bargaining unit prior to the expiration date of
the agreement. 2 2
This premise, that the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement are binding upon rookies who had no actual say in the
bargaining process, was adopted by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, which further elaborated on the point, while affirming the
district court's decision denying Mr. Wood's motion for injunctive
relief 223 In response to Mr. Wood's argument that the salary cap
was illegal because it affects NBA players (employees) who were
outside of the bargaining unit when the agreement was struck, the
court stated that this effect is a "commonplace consequence of col-
lective agreements . . . . [In fact,] the National Labor Relations
Act explicitly defines 'employee' in a way that includes workers
outside the bargaining unit. ' 224 Further, the court stated that
"even if some such arrangements [collective bargaining agree-
ments] might be illegal because of discrimination against new em-
ployees [players] the proper action would be one for breach of the
duty of fair representation. 2 25 As this would involve a draft pick
suing his fellow players, it is doubtful such a suit would ever come
to fruition. A player who initiated such a suit would indeed have a
long and frustrating career if he were to single-handedly shoot
down an agreement upon which the majority of the players had
agreed.
THE VETERAN PROVISION
One of the knocks against the salary cap is that it is discrimi-
natory in its application because it unduly burdens the league's
non-stars. These complaints date all the way back to 1984.226 The
problem arises from the fact that in many instances, teams use the
bulk of the limited amount of money they are permitted to spend
under the cap to sign their marquee players. This, in turn, leaves
little money to sign the players who serve in valuable reserve ca-
221. Id. at 529.
222. Id.
223. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
224. Id. at 960.
225. Id. at 962.
226. In 1984, Greg Ballard, then a member of the Washington Bullets, stated that
while the new agreement was supposed to benefit all of the players, it really only benefitted
the superstar players. David Dupree, 60 Slated to Become Free Agents in NBA, WAsH.
PosT, Apr. 22, 1984, at C8.
[Vol. 11:251
64
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss2/3
NBA SALARY CAP
pacities.22 7 Thus, many of these players are faced with the option
of signing for at or about the minimum salary, or going abroad to
earn greater wages in one of the many European professional
leagues.22 Following the best economic opportunities, many of
these players opt for the European route. Thus, the cap, in a
roundabout way, is having the effect of pricing the valuable, re-
serve-capacity veteran player out of the league.229
This is an undesirable effect for several reasons. It is unfair to
the players. Most players, assuming the pay was equal, would
rather stay home and play in the NBA than go to Europe. Also,
this trend threatens to dilute talent in the league, thereby weaken-
ing the on-court product. Finally, it threatens to prompt the same
kind of locker room tension sought to be avoided by the institution
of a rookie cap. Indeed, it must be an unpleasant situation for a
player to enter a locker room where his peers earn two, three, ten,
and even twenty times what he does.
All of these negative factors can be alleviated if, in the next
collective bargaining agreement, the league and the players create
a new exception to the salary cap. Under such an exception, a team
would be permitted to pay a veteran player a predetermined
amount above the allocated cap minimum, without having that
money counted against them under the salary cap.23 Note, how-
ever, the exception would not be mandatory; rather, it would give a
team the option to do so if it so desired.
This would have many positive effects. First, it would keep
home the many veterans who would otherwise leave for the greater
227. For example, as of October 1, 1993, while the Los Angeles Lakers had five players
on their payroll who were to earn over $1.5 million for the 1993-94 season, they also had five
players slated to earn less than $250,000 for the same season. Player Contracts, supra note
70.
228. European leagues have made a steady practice of snatching up NBA-caliber play-
ers who have difficulty coming to terms with the teams that possess their rights. THE SPORT-
ING NEWS, NBA REGISTER (1993).
229. One player whose situation represents this trend is forward Chucky Brown of the
New Jersey Nets. Brown has proven he has the ability to play in this league and is an
adequate back-up forward. In his four-year career, in which he has played for three different
teams, he has scored at a clip of seven points per game, despite averaging less than 17
minutes per game for his career. THE SPORTING NEWS, NBA REGISTER 29 (1993). For the
1994-95 season, Brown is under contract with the New Jersey Nets to play for the league
minimum of $150,000. Player Contracts, supra note 70. Brown could command considerably
more in Europe.
230. For example, allow a $75,000 exception for each year of NBA service and provide
for a ceiling to the exception of $750,000. Thus, a player who has played in the league for
five years can be offered $375,000 (five years at $75,000) above the $150,000 minimum with
only the $150,000 minimum being counted against the cap.
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salaries available in Europe,"8 1 thereby helping ensure that the
available talent is not diluted. Second, valued veterans who con-
tribute to their teams off the court as much as on the court can
now be retained without embarrassing such players by paying
them the league minimum.2 32 Similarly, teams who wish to present
such veterans legitimate offers are freed from the burden of having
to create room under the salary cap.2"' Recall, the recommended
exception is an optional one. Thus, in its application, it would
most likely only be extended to veterans who fall under the head-
ing of "good citizen," the type of veteran a team wants around to
have its young players learn from. In essence, the exception would
allow an NBA team to provide for a quasi-mentor program for
their young stars without significantly affecting team salaries. The
presence of these "elder statesmen" would certainly benefit the
league. Any time a team introduces a means for upgrading the in-
tegrity of the league as well as the quality of play, it can only bene-
fit all involved. Management might also see some attractive fea-
tures in this provision. They could now sign the veteran free agent
they desire without subtracting money from the cap, which they
could better use to sign their building blocks for the future. Fur-
ther, such an exception, if crafted properly, would remain immune
from the possibility of abuse.2"4
231. For example, Rick Mahorn, a quality power forward with 11 years of experience,
and who was named to the NBA All-Defensive second team in 1990, was forced to go abroad
in 1991-92 when he played for I1 Messagero Roma of the Italian Professional League. THE
SPORTING NEWS, NBA REGISTER 116 (1993). Several NBA teams had showed interest in
Mahorn, but none were able to offer him the kind of money he stood to make in Italy.
232. As of October 1, 1993, all of the following NBA veterans, many of whom were
once impact players, were scheduled to receive the league minimum salary for the 1993-94
season:
Bernard King Kiki Vandeweghe Danny Young
Ed Nealy Trent Tucker Darrel Walker
Terry Teagle Maurice Cheeks Chucky Brown
Sleepy Floyd
Player Contracts, supra note 70.
233. For the 1991-92 NBA season, any team would have enjoyed the veteran leader-
ship that a player like Rick Mahorn offers. See supra note 230. No team in the league,
however, was willing to clear up enough room under the cap to keep Rick from going abroad.
Under this proposal, Mahorn would have had his pick of every team that chose to offer him
a contract, which pursuant to this exception could have been worth $900,000 ($150,000 in
salary and $750,000 from the exception), of which only $150,000 would be counted for cap
purposes. The $900,000 figure would have most likely been enough to keep "the Horn" here
in the United States. Based upon information obtained via confidential sources.
234. The exception should only be available to veterans who would otherwise be
signed to the league minimum. It should not be applicable, for example, when a team would
like to pay a veteran $1.5 million but can only clear $1 million under the cap. The $500,000
difference could not be made up via this exception. The maximum salary that could be
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CONCLUSION
The collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and
the Players Association is not violative of antitrust law. The agree-
ment's questioned legality does not pose a threat to its continued
existence. With the agreement due to expire, however, at the close
of the 1993-94 NBA season, professional basketball is at a critical
juncture in its history. In the game of basketball, selfishness is a
most contagious disease. Once it rears its ugly head, it is terribly
difficult to combat, and can have devastating effects. On the play-
ing court, selfishness can cripple even the most talented of basket-
ball teams. Similarly, it has the capacity to do the same to the
league as a whole. As the league and the Players Association nego-
tiate the next collective bargaining agreement, both sides must be
prepared to give as well as take.
The Players Association has postured that it will push for a
discontinuance of the cap. Thus, it appears that the players will
have the upper hand in the negotiations, especially in light of the
fact that the district court approved the contract recently signed
by Chris Dudley.2 35 If a new agreement is not struck, the former
agreement will continue to govern.2 8 Under the ruling of the dis-
trict court in the Dudley case, termination provisions are a legiti-
mate contractual tool under the most recent agreement. Thus, the
salary cap presently exists in name only. If a salary cap allows for
termination provisions such as Dudley's, the cap cannot accom-
plish its purpose.23 7 The existence of a salary cap which allows for
termination provisions akin to the one in the Dudley contract
threatens to harm, and possibly even destroy, the league. Thus, it
is the league's owners who are under pressure to strike a new
agreement as soon as possible, and must, therefore, be prepared to
offered under the exception is $900,000 ($150,000 league minimum plus $750,000 maximum
allowable exception to a veteran of ten or more years). If a team sought to sign a player for
more than that, his entire salary would have to fit under the cap, unless another exception
was available.
Also, a team would not be able to offer a few great players the bulk of the salary cap
and then have a handful of veterans who benefit from this provision, such that the team is
technically within the confines of the cap, but is, in actuality, far in excess of the cap on
account of this exception. While this remains theoretically possible, it is almost certain that
such a situation would never arise. Recall, the ultimate goal of an NBA franchise is to win a
championship. This can not be accomplished with a roster full of marginal veterans, who in
the absence of this exception would not be able to command more than the league
minimum.
235. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Association, 838 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 1993).
236. See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
237. See supra text accompanying note 131.
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give in to the players in several instances. In order to appease the
players, "defined gross revenue" should be redefined to give the
players a much sweeter share of the pot.
The players, however, would be foolish to take advantage of
the league.2 They should not lose sight of the fact that under the
reign of the salary cap, they have benefitted tremendously. Should
they not willingly agree to a revamped continuance of the cap,
which explicitly disallowed termination provisions such as the type
employed in the Dudley contract, as soon as possible, they may
very well be doing themselves a tremendous disservice in the long
run. Should the cap be discontinued completely, or continued with
termination provisions, the players may soon find their potential
earning power declining as the league begins to feel the ill-effects
of life without an effective cap. Also, the players would be wise to
allow for the introduction of a rookie cap. If "defined gross reve-
nue" is indeed redefined, the players will be receiving ample
money. It coincides with general principles of fairness to make cer-
tain this money is properly allocated to those who deserve it
most. 23e The rookie cap will provide a framework to ensure that
238. The Players Association is currently involved in a dilemma all its own. Isiah
Thomas of the Detroit Pistons is the current president of the Players Association. Isiah,
however, has just come to terms with the Pistons on a deal which will make Isiah a member
of the Piston organization for life. NBA Notebook, MIAMI HERALD, January 8, 1994, at 5D.
More importantly, the deal promises Isiah 10% ownership of the team upon his retirement.
Query as to how Thomas can bargain in good faith on behalf of the Players Association
when it is common knowledge that he is soon to become part of management.
239. In order to deal with the ever-wealthier NBA player, another change need be
made in the business of professional basketball. This change, however, falls outside of the
scope of the collective bargaining agreement. Nonetheless, it cannot go unmentioned. Pres-
ently, the way most NBA teams allocate power throughout their front office leaves some-
thing to be desired. NBA teams should endow their coaches with more power so that they
can more effectively control what goes on on the basketball court. Most teams have a gen-
eral manager to whom a coach is subordinate. Yet, it is the coach who is directly responsible
for the team's on-the-court performance. Should a coach and a player come into conflict,
often the player and or players go over the coaches' head and complain to the general man-
ager. If the town is not big enough for both the coach and the player(s), it is usually the
coach who goes.
It should also be noted that NBA players on the average make considerably more than
NBA coaches. In many instances, it has become somewhat impossible to coach the NBA
player. How can a player be expected to follow orders from a man whom he knows only
makes a portion of what he does, especially when the player knows that if push comes to
shove he will win the battle? Hence, NBA coaches are often relegated to the role of baby
sitter, forced to appease the sometimes selfish and lazy desires of their players, so that the
coach does not lose his job. As a result, the on-court product often tends to suffer. A coach
is supposed to lead and guide his team, but how can a team be at its best when the head is
necessarily inferior to the tail?
This raised consciousness of the ever-wealthier NBA player, aware of his significant
power over team affairs, was recently made very clear by the actions of. the New Jersey Nets'
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this happens.
This Article has not been written with a bias in favor of one
party over another. Rather, it has been written from the perspec-
tive of an individual who truly loves the sport of professional bas-
ketball and cares very deeply about its continued success. All the
suggestions contained herein are motivated by the underlying con-
cern of how to best provide for the continued health and prosper-
ity of professional basketball, which translates into profitable
franchises and the continued rise of player salaries. As the league
and the players head towards crunch time of the single most im-
portant game ever played, hopefully both sides will emerge
victorious.
spoiled man-child, Derrick Coleman. Coleman, a three-year veteran, possesses unquestiona-
ble ability. Nonetheless, he has yet to be named an NBA All-Star. Recently, he rejected an
offer the Nets tendered him that would have made him the highest paid player in the
league. See supra note 199. Justifying the refusal, Coleman stated:
Some people call me a problem child. When I was at Syracuse, Coach Jim
Boeheim used to ask my mother, "How come every time I tell Derrick to do
something, he has to ask, 'Why?'" Here I feuded with Bill Fitch, refused to get
off the bench in one game at Miami Arena. He doesn't coach here any more.
- ..You don't understand. I am the game."
S.L. Price, supra note 199, at 11H (emphasis not in original).
To deal effectively with this "modern player," NBA coaches must be given a sufficient
amount of power in regard to a team's basketball operations. Paying coaches higher wages
alone won't help the situation, since the players will always make far more. Power is the
missing ingredient. If a coach were at liberty to bench, trade, or waive a player for any
reason he deemed sufficient, he would then be able to do his job effectively. The bottom line
is that all players, or at the least, most players, are still concerned about their playing
time-regardless of how much money they make. If they knew they had to follow their
coaches' rules in order to stay on the playing court, they will probably respond. Unfortu-
nately, this is one area where the business aspect of the sport truly dominates. The underly-
ing mentality seems to be that fans want to see certain players on the floor, and it is not the
coach's place to alter that scheme. Management has made this decision. Thus, players, for
the most part, do as they wish and there is little coaches can do about it. With few excep-
tions, coaches are not provided with sufficient authority. Query as to whether the sports
business's best interests are really being served. Seemingly, it would be in the sport's best
business interest to do whatever is possible to improve the ultimate product: NBA games.
Constantly pampering the game's highly paid young stars may create a situation where the
league will cease to become a marketable entity. The day may come when fans will no longer
pay to see spoiled, uncoachable millionares.
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